CVE-2026-113495 in Red Hat
Summary
by MITRE • 10/20/2026
A flaw was found in cockpit-machines. Red Hat Subscription Management (RHSM) authentication tokens are passed as command-line arguments to background helper processes during image retrieval operations. A local, unprivileged attacker on a system permitting cross-user process inspection can view these arguments while the process is active. This flaw can lead to information disclosure, potentially allowing unauthorized access to RHSM resources within the token's validity period.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in cockpit-machines represents a critical failure in secure credential handling during automated image retrieval operations. Specifically, Red Hat Subscription Management authentication tokens are transmitted as command-line arguments when invoking background helper processes. This architectural decision exposes sensitive security material to unintended observers within the local system environment. The core technical flaw lies in the method of inter-process communication and argument passing, where high-privilege or sensitive data is made visible through standard process inspection mechanisms rather than being passed via secure channels such as file descriptors, memory mapping, or encrypted sockets.
In Linux-based operating systems, command-line arguments for running processes are accessible to any user who has permission to inspect the process table, typically via tools like ps or /proc filesystem entries. While modern security models often restrict this visibility based on user IDs and namespace isolation, a local unprivileged attacker with cross-user inspection capabilities can easily retrieve these arguments while the helper process is active. This creates a window of opportunity where the authentication token, which serves as proof of identity for RHSM operations, is exposed in plaintext within the system's memory and process metadata.
The operational impact of this information disclosure is significant because it allows an attacker to potentially hijack or misuse the subscription management credentials. If the attacker captures the token before its expiration, they can authenticate against Red Hat Subscription Management services as if they were the original user or service account. This could lead to unauthorized access to software repositories, installation of malicious packages under trusted signatures, modification of system configurations managed by RHSM, or exfiltration of subscription data that reveals organizational infrastructure details. The severity is compounded by the fact that cockpit-machines often runs with elevated privileges to manage virtual machines and containers, meaning the compromised token may have broader permissions than a standard user account would possess.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, specifically regarding the exposure of sensitive data through command-line arguments, and can be categorized under CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information if the token leakage is considered a form of unintended information release. From an ATT&CK perspective, this flaw facilitates Initial Access or Credential Access techniques where adversaries leverage local system conditions to harvest credentials without direct exploitation of application logic flaws but rather through environmental misconfiguration and poor secure coding practices regarding secret management.
To mitigate this risk, the immediate remediation involves modifying cockpit-machines to avoid passing authentication tokens as command-line arguments entirely. Instead, secrets should be passed via environment variables that are not visible in process listings or, more securely, through file descriptors inherited from a parent process during fork operations. Additionally, implementing strict access controls on /proc entries and ensuring that cross-user process inspection is restricted by default can reduce the attack surface. Long-term solutions include adopting secret management frameworks like HashiCorp Vault or Kubernetes Secrets for handling subscription credentials, thereby eliminating the need to expose tokens in plain text within running processes. Regular audits of inter-process communication patterns should also be conducted to identify similar vulnerabilities across other components that interact with RHSM.