CVE-2026-115293 in Kibana
Summary
by MITRE • 11/03/2026
Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data (CWE-201) in Kibana Observability onboarding can lead to disclosure of the credentials that Kibana uses to connect to Elasticsearch. When these credentials are embedded in the Elasticsearch host URLs in the Kibana configuration, an authenticated user with the privileges to onboard Observability data can obtain them. The user can then access Elasticsearch directly with the privileges of the Kibana service account, which are outside the privileges granted to that user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/03/2026
The vulnerability identified as CWE-201 involves the improper insertion of sensitive information into sent data within the Kibana Observability onboarding workflow. This flaw specifically affects scenarios where Elasticsearch host URLs in the Kibana configuration contain embedded credentials, such as usernames and passwords or API keys. While embedding credentials directly in connection strings is generally discouraged due to security risks, it remains a supported configuration method for certain legacy setups or simplified deployments. The core issue arises from how Kibana handles this sensitive data during the onboarding process for Observability features. When an authenticated user initiates the observability setup, the system processes and potentially exposes these embedded credentials in a manner that allows them to be retrieved by the active session.
From a technical perspective, the flaw lies in the handling of configuration parameters during the initialization phase of the Kibana service account connection. The vulnerability enables any authenticated user who possesses the specific privileges required to onboard Observability data to extract the Elasticsearch host URLs containing embedded credentials. This extraction can occur through various vectors depending on the exact version and implementation details, such as via API responses or client-side script execution that reflects configuration values back to the browser without proper sanitization. The critical aspect is that this exposure happens within an authenticated context, meaning the attacker does not need zero-day exploits for authentication bypass but rather relies on legitimate access rights being misused due to poor data handling practices in the application logic.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe because it facilitates a privilege escalation attack. An attacker who gains access to Kibana with limited user privileges can leverage this flaw to obtain the credentials used by the Kibana service account to connect to Elasticsearch. These service accounts typically hold elevated permissions, often including superuser or administrative roles necessary for managing indices and system settings across the entire cluster. By obtaining these credentials, an attacker gains direct access to Elasticsearch outside of Kibana's security controls and role-based access restrictions. This allows the attacker to perform actions that are strictly prohibited by their assigned user role in Kibana, such as reading sensitive data from all indexes, modifying index mappings, or potentially executing malicious queries against other tenants if multi-tenancy is enabled.
This behavior aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, specifically the aspect of using legitimate credentials to gain unauthorized access. Furthermore, it relates to CWE-201 as a classic example of sensitive information exposure through improper data handling in network communications or application responses. The attack path is straightforward: an authenticated user accesses the observability onboarding interface, triggers the relevant API calls or page loads that expose the configuration details, captures the embedded credentials from the response payload, and then uses these credentials to authenticate directly against the Elasticsearch cluster. This bypasses all audit logs and security policies enforced by Kibana's authentication layer, providing a direct line of attack into the backend data store.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate exposure risk and the underlying configuration practice. The most effective remediation is to remove embedded credentials from the Elasticsearch host URLs in the kibana.yml configuration file. Instead, administrators should use separate credential fields provided by Kibana for storing usernames and passwords securely, ensuring they are encrypted at rest or managed through external secret management systems if supported by the version. If immediate removal of embedded credentials is not feasible due to legacy constraints, applying strict access controls to limit who can initiate observability onboarding is critical. Only users with absolute necessity should be granted these privileges. Additionally, enabling audit logging for configuration changes and credential usage can help detect unauthorized attempts to exploit this flaw. Regular security audits of Kibana configurations are recommended to ensure no sensitive data is inadvertently exposed through API responses or client-side scripts during routine operations.