CVE-2026-116246 in pgAdmin 4
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
To pass a server's password to psql and to the utilities pgAdmin 4 runs as background processes, the server manager wrote it into pgAdmin's own process environment: as PGPASSWORD for the PSQL tool, and under a per-process variable for a utility. Nothing removed it afterwards. pgAdmin's environment is shared by every user's requests and copied into every process it starts, so in server mode another user's later PSQL session or utility inherited the password, and libpq used PGPASSWORD for any connection made without a password of its own, letting one user connect with another user's saved password.
The fix puts the password only into the environment built for the process that needs it and starts psql with a copy of pgAdmin's environment instead of the environment itself.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes an insecure information disclosure flaw within pgAdmin 4, specifically affecting versions prior to 9.19. This security defect arises from improper handling of sensitive credentials during the execution of external database utilities such as psql and other background processes managed by the server manager component. When a user configures a connection that requires authentication, the system writes the password into the process environment variables for convenience, specifically assigning it to PGPASSWORD for PostgreSQL client tools or storing it in per-process variables for other utilities. However, the implementation fails to sanitize these sensitive values from the environment after the utility has completed its task. This oversight creates a persistent state where credentials remain accessible within the memory space of the pgAdmin process long after they are no longer needed.
The core technical flaw lies in how pgAdmin manages its execution context and child processes. In server mode, pgAdmin operates as a central service that handles multiple concurrent user requests. The environment variables set for one specific operation are inadvertently shared across all subsequent operations because the parent process retains these values in its global or session-level environment block. When pgAdmin spawns new subprocesses to execute database commands, it passes this entire inherited environment rather than constructing an isolated context containing only the necessary parameters. Consequently, any user initiating a request that triggers a child process will inherit the environment variables left behind by previous users who utilized password-based authentication. This mechanism effectively allows one authenticated user to access another user's credentials simply by triggering specific utility executions within their own session.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it leads directly to unauthorized database access and potential data breach. An attacker with valid but limited privileges on the pgAdmin interface can exploit this environment variable leakage to connect to PostgreSQL databases using other users' saved passwords. Since libpq, the underlying client library used by psql, automatically utilizes PGPASSWORD when no explicit password is provided in a connection string, the leaked credential is seamlessly applied without requiring additional input from the attacker. This bypasses standard authentication controls and allows lateral movement within the database infrastructure or exfiltration of sensitive data belonging to other tenants or users sharing the same pgAdmin instance. The risk is particularly acute in multi-tenant deployments where strict isolation between user sessions is critical for compliance with security policies such as GDPR, HIPAA, or PCI-DSS standards regarding credential protection and access control.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, specifically the improper storage and handling of credentials in environment variables that are shared across processes. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1530: Data from Local System Descriptions, as it involves accessing data stored on a local system (the process memory/environment) without proper authorization. Furthermore, it relates to CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information if the leaked credentials are exposed through error logs or debug outputs generated by subsequent processes that inherit the tainted environment. The lack of immediate cleanup violates fundamental principles of least privilege and secure coding practices regarding sensitive data lifecycle management.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must upgrade pgAdmin 4 to version 9.19 or later, where the fix ensures that passwords are only injected into the specific environment block required for a single process execution. The corrected implementation starts psql with a clean copy of the parent's environment rather than passing the entire mutable context, thereby preventing cross-user credential leakage. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should enforce strict access controls to limit who can execute database utilities through pgAdmin and consider running pgAdmin instances in isolated containers or virtual machines to reduce the blast radius if an attacker manages to exploit this flaw before a patch is applied. Regular auditing of process environment variables during development and code reviews for similar patterns in custom integrations can also help prevent recurrence of such information disclosure issues.