CVE-2026-116674 in systeminformation
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. Prior to 5.33.13, networkStats(ifaces) in lib/network.js on FreeBSD, OpenBSD, and NetBSD stores per-interface data in the plain-object _network cache and indexes it with the sanitized caller-controlled interface name. Passing proto causes the inherited Object.prototype value to be used instead of creating an own cache entry, so calcNetworkSpeed() writes rx_bytes, tx_bytes, rx_sec, tx_sec, ms, last_ms, and operstate onto Object.prototype. The polluted property names are fixed and their values come from interface statistics, but inherited-name collisions and enumerable keys can corrupt application branching, serialization, configuration merging, validation, or lookup behavior. This issue is fixed in version 5.33.13.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The vulnerability identified in the systeminformation library for Node.js represents a classic prototype pollution attack vector arising from improper handling of object properties during data aggregation operations. Specifically, within versions prior to 5.33.13, the networkStats function located in lib/network.js exhibits flawed logic when processing interface statistics on FreeBSD, OpenBSD, and NetBSD operating systems. The core technical flaw lies in how the library manages its internal _network cache using plain JavaScript objects as storage mechanisms without sufficient safeguards against key injection or prototype manipulation. When the calcNetworkSpeed() method is invoked to compute network performance metrics such as bytes received, bytes transmitted, speed per second, latency, and operational state, it attempts to store these values into an object keyed by the interface name provided by the caller.
The critical failure occurs when a specific input condition triggers inheritance from Object.prototype rather than creating a new own property on the target cache object. In JavaScript, objects inherit properties from their prototype chain unless explicitly prevented or handled correctly. If the library fails to check for existing keys in the prototype chain before assignment, or if it uses methods that do not isolate the storage container from global prototypes, maliciously crafted interface names can cause values like rx_bytes, tx_bytes, and operstate to be written directly onto Object.prototype itself rather than into a local instance. This results in property pollution where these specific keys become enumerable properties of all subsequent plain objects created within the same execution context or module scope that do not explicitly break prototype inheritance chains.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to the pervasive nature of object iteration and serialization in Node.js applications. Because the polluted properties are inherited by default, any code performing a for-in loop over an object will encounter these unexpected keys, potentially leading to incorrect branching logic or data corruption during configuration merging processes. Furthermore, standard JSON.stringify operations may inadvertently include these injected values if they become enumerable on global objects, which can lead to security issues such as information leakage of sensitive system statistics through serialized payloads sent to external services. This behavior also disrupts validation routines that rely on strict key existence checks and lookup mechanisms that assume a clean object structure free from prototype contamination.
From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-1325, which covers the improper check for unusual or exceptional conditions in software logic, specifically relating to prototype pollution via insecure property assignment patterns. It also maps closely to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1098.004, representing Account Manipulation through SSH key addition if such manipulation were possible, but more accurately fits under general application-level exploitation techniques involving data injection and state corruption rather than direct system compromise. The root cause is fundamentally a lack of isolation in object creation patterns, failing to utilize Object.create(null) or similar safe instantiation methods that prevent prototype inheritance during cache population.
Mitigation strategies primarily involve upgrading the library to version 5.33.13 where this logic has been corrected to ensure own properties are created exclusively without polluting the global prototype chain. For applications unable to upgrade immediately, developers should implement defensive coding practices by validating all interface names against a whitelist of known valid network interfaces before passing them to systeminformation functions. Additionally, using Object.create(null) for any custom cache objects or employing deep cloning libraries that handle prototype chains correctly can mitigate similar risks in other parts of the application stack where plain object manipulation occurs without proper isolation checks.