CVE-2026-129237 in qbee-agentinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/16/2026

qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.41, the unpackTar extraction logic in app/utils/tar.go validates cleaned archive entry paths with strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) without enforcing a path-separator boundary. When UseContext enables the Docker Compose build context path in app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go, a less-privileged archive supplier with delegated configuration and/or file-manager access can provide a sibling-prefix traversal entry that passes the check, causing utils.UnpackTar to create directories and regular files outside the intended context extraction directory with qbee-agent process privileges, despite the supplier lacking authority to write those sibling files. In deployments where only full device or fleet administrators can provide Docker Compose context archives, this behavior is hardening rather than a crossed security boundary. The demonstrated impact is limited to nearby cache or project paths sharing the destination prefix, may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, and does not establish arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2026.41.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026

The vulnerability identified within the qbee-agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform represents a classic path traversal flaw rooted in insufficient validation logic during archive extraction operations. Specifically, the function responsible for unpacking tar archives located at app/utils/tar.go employs a security check that relies on strings.HasPrefix to verify whether an extracted file's target path begins with the intended destination directory prefix. While this approach aims to restrict file creation to within the designated context folder, it fails to enforce a strict boundary condition by not requiring a trailing slash or path separator after the prefix string. This technical oversight allows for sibling-prefix traversal attacks where maliciously crafted archive entries can exploit the lack of delimiter validation to escape the intended extraction directory and write files into adjacent directories that share the same initial character sequence as the target folder.

The operational impact of this flaw is realized when an attacker leverages delegated configuration or file-manager access, which are permissions granted to less-privileged users within the platform's ecosystem. By constructing a tar archive containing entries with paths designed to bypass the prefix check, such as using relative path components like .. that align with the validation logic due to the missing separator enforcement, an adversary can cause the qbee-agent process to create directories and regular files outside of its authorized scope. Since these operations are executed under the privileges of the qbee-agent service, the resulting file writes occur at a higher privilege level than intended for the user providing the archive. This capability undermines the principle of least privilege by allowing lower-level actors to modify system state in areas they should not have access to, potentially affecting the integrity and availability of Docker Compose managed states or interfering with nearby cache and project paths that share the destination prefix.

From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, as it involves an application not properly neutralizing special elements within file names to prevent access outside restricted directories. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior can be categorized under T1564.008 Hidden Files and Directories or potentially T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification if the attacker modifies permissions on created files, although the primary concern here is unauthorized file creation outside sandboxed boundaries. It is important to note that in deployments where only full device or fleet administrators are permitted to provide Docker Compose context archives, this issue serves more as a security hardening gap rather than a critical crossed boundary, since those high-privilege users already possess significant control over the system state.

The demonstrated impact does not extend to arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution capabilities, which limits the immediate risk of remote code execution but still poses significant risks regarding data integrity and service availability. An attacker could potentially disrupt ongoing deployments by corrupting configuration files in sibling directories or consume disk space through malicious file creation. The resolution for this vulnerability was implemented in version 2026.41 of the qbee-agent software, where the unpackTar logic has been updated to enforce proper path-separator boundaries during validation. Organizations utilizing versions prior to this release should prioritize upgrading their agent installations to mitigate the risk of unauthorized file system modifications and ensure that archive extraction processes strictly adhere to sandboxed directory constraints.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

11/13/2026

Disclosure

11/16/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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