CVE-2026-129299 in mail-parser
Summary
by MITRE • 11/16/2026
mail-parser is a tool that parses emails by enhancing the Python standard library and extracting message details into a comprehensive object. Prior to 4.6.2, multiple message-processing behaviors can raise exceptions or silently lose content. Headers colliding with methods such as Parse, Message, and Write_Attachments can place bound method objects into parsed output and raise TypeError when a caller requests JSON serialization such as mail_json. When byte input is parsed through parse_from_bytes(), an 8-bit header value returned as email.header.Header can likewise raise TypeError when an X_raw accessor passes the value to json.dumps; both exceptions are outside the MailParserError hierarchy. Separately, rewritten names such as Subject_json and X_Spam_Flag can be substituted or disappear from mail, headers, and JSON output while has_defects remains false, and a headerless message can be treated as falsy before parser state is initialized, causing body and attachment properties to return empty values without an error signal. These behaviors can abort message processing or hide malicious indicators from downstream scanners. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.2.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026
The mail-parser library serves as a critical utility for email security operations by parsing raw email data into structured objects that facilitate analysis, threat hunting, and automated response workflows. Prior to the release of version 4.6.2, this tool exhibited several significant reliability flaws rooted in improper exception handling and state management logic. These vulnerabilities primarily manifest during the serialization phase or when processing malformed input streams, leading to unhandled exceptions that can abruptly terminate parsing processes. In security contexts where mail-parser is integrated into larger pipelines for malware detection or phishing analysis, such abrupt terminations represent a denial of service condition that prevents downstream systems from receiving and analyzing email content, thereby creating blind spots in defensive monitoring capabilities.
A primary technical flaw involves the collision between header names and internal method attributes within the parsed message object. When an email contains headers with names identical to existing methods or properties of the MailParser class, such as Parse, Message, or Write_Attachments, the library incorrectly assigns bound method objects into the parsed output structure rather than treating them as standard string data. This misclassification causes a TypeError when downstream applications attempt to serialize the object using JSON formats via functions like mail_json. Because these exceptions are not caught within the MailParserError hierarchy defined by the library, they propagate up the call stack unhandled. From an industry standards perspective, this behavior aligns with CWE-248 Uncaught Exception and CWE-755 Improper Handling of Unexpected or Incompatible Data Types, as the parser fails to validate that header values are compatible with expected data structures before assignment.
Further complications arise when parsing byte input through the parse_from_bytes() function. If an email contains eight-bit header values encoded in a way that results in them being returned as instances of email.header.Header rather than plain strings, accessing these headers via X_raw and subsequently passing them to json.dumps triggers another TypeError. This specific failure mode highlights a deficiency in type coercion logic within the library's accessor methods. The inability to handle non-standard encoding or complex header structures without raising uncaught exceptions means that any message containing such characteristics will cause processing failures. This is particularly dangerous because it allows attackers who can influence email headers, even indirectly through spoofing or injection techniques, to disrupt automated analysis pipelines by crafting messages with specific byte sequences in their headers.
Beyond serialization errors, the library suffers from logical flaws related to header rewriting and state initialization that result in silent data loss rather than explicit failures. Headers such as Subject_json and X_Spam_Flag may be unexpectedly substituted or completely removed from the mail object, its internal headers collection, and the final JSON output while the has_defects flag remains false. This creates a deceptive scenario where security analysts are led to believe the message is intact because no error flags are raised, yet critical metadata required for classification or forensic investigation is missing. Such behavior constitutes CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information if it leaks internal state details, but more accurately represents CWE-538 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible Data Structure due to the unintended modification and potential leakage of header data through JSON serialization without proper sanitization or validation.
Additionally, a critical initialization flaw exists where a message lacking headers is incorrectly treated as falsy before the parser state has been fully initialized. This logical error causes subsequent requests for body content or attachment properties to return empty values silently rather than raising an appropriate exception indicating missing data. In operational terms, this means that malicious payloads embedded in email bodies or attachments may go undetected because the scanner receives an empty object and assumes no payload exists. This silent failure mode is particularly insidious as it bypasses standard error-checking mechanisms, allowing threats to slip through automated defenses without triggering alerts. The lack of explicit signaling for missing content violates principles of fail-safe defaults and robust input validation found in CWE-253 Incorrect Check of Function Return Value and CWE-704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast.
These vulnerabilities collectively undermine the integrity and reliability of email security tools that depend on mail-parser for accurate data extraction. The combination of unhandled exceptions causing process termination and silent data loss leading to missed detections creates a dual threat landscape where availability is compromised through crashes, and confidentiality or detection efficacy is undermined by missing indicators. To mitigate these risks, organizations relying on this library must immediately upgrade to version 4.6.2 or later, which addresses the type handling issues in JSON serialization, corrects the header collision logic, fixes the byte input parsing flaws, and resolves the state initialization errors for headerless messages. Until such updates are applied, security teams should implement wrapper code that catches generic exceptions during mail parsing operations to prevent pipeline failures and validate output completeness before passing data to downstream analysis engines.