CVE-2026-134257 in Admidioinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/21/2026

Admidio before 5.0.18 contains an insufficient session expiration vulnerability that allows attackers to keep account access after a forgot-password reset because User::setPassword() deletes sessions using the visitor ID instead of the reset user's usr_id. Attackers already holding a victim's session or remember-me cookie can continue using it after the victim resets the password, keeping authenticated access to the account.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The vulnerability identified in Admidio versions prior to 5.0.18 represents a critical flaw in session management logic that undermines the fundamental security expectation of credential rotation. When an administrator or user initiates a password reset via the forgot-password mechanism, the system is designed to invalidate existing active sessions for that specific account to prevent unauthorized access using stale credentials. However, the implementation contains a logical error where the function responsible for clearing these sessions relies on the visitor ID associated with the current request context rather than the unique user identifier of the target account. This discrepancy means that while the password hash is updated in the database, the session tokens tied to other active connections remain valid and functional within the application state.

From a technical perspective, this flaw stems from an incorrect mapping between authentication identifiers during the cleanup phase. The User::setPassword() method iterates through or targets sessions based on the IP address or temporary visitor token of the person triggering the reset, rather than querying for all active sessions linked to the usr_id of the account being secured. Consequently, if a malicious actor has previously obtained a valid session cookie from a victim's browser—whether through cross-site scripting, network sniffing in unsecured environments, or physical access—they retain full authenticated privileges even after the legitimate user changes their password. The application fails to recognize that the session token belongs to the compromised account and therefore does not revoke it, allowing the attacker to continue operating as if no security event had occurred.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in environments where sensitive personal data or administrative controls are managed through Admidio. An attacker leveraging a stolen remember-me cookie or active session token can maintain persistent access to the victim's account indefinitely until they manually log out or the application server restarts and clears all sessions. This effectively nullifies the primary purpose of password resets, which is to revoke unauthorized access in response to suspected compromise. The persistence of these sessions allows for continued data exfiltration, modification of user profiles, elevation of privileges if the victim holds administrative roles, and potential lateral movement within systems that trust Admidio's authentication output. This behavior aligns with CWE-613, which classifies insufficient session expiration as a weakness where active sessions are not properly invalidated upon credential changes or logout actions.

Furthermore, this vulnerability facilitates sustained unauthorized access scenarios often associated with ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically valid accounts and potentially T1528 for stealing application login credentials if the attacker initially acquired them via phishing or malware. The inability to force a session invalidation means that traditional incident response procedures relying on password resets as an immediate containment measure are rendered ineffective against this specific attack vector. Security teams must recognize that changing passwords alone is insufficient mitigation when session management logic is flawed, requiring additional steps such as manual session termination at the server level or database cleanup of active tokens for affected users.

To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Admidio versions prior to 5.0.18 should immediately upgrade to version 5.0.18 or later where the code has been corrected to properly invalidate all sessions associated with the usr_id during password resets. In cases where immediate patching is not feasible, administrators can implement compensating controls by configuring shorter session timeouts and remember-me cookie lifespans to limit the window of opportunity for attackers using stolen tokens. Additionally, enabling multi-factor authentication adds a layer of defense that may prevent account takeover even if session cookies are compromised, as subsequent actions would require additional verification factors beyond just possession of the valid session token. Regular audits of active sessions and monitoring for anomalous login patterns from different geographic locations or devices can also help detect exploitation attempts earlier in the attack lifecycle.

Responsible

VulnCheck

Reservation

11/21/2026

Disclosure

11/21/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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