CVE-2026-22850 in koko-analytics Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 01/19/2026
Koko Analytics is an open-source analytics plugin for WordPress. Versions prior to 2.1.3 are vulnerable to arbitrary SQL execution through unescaped analytics export/import and permissive admin SQL import. Unauthenticated visitors can submit arbitrary path (`pa`) and referrer (`r`) values to the public tracking endpoint in src/Resources/functions/collect.php, which stores those strings verbatim in the analytics tables. The admin export logic in src/Admin/Data_Export.php writes these stored values directly into SQL INSERT statements without escaping. A crafted path such as "),('999','x');DROP TABLE wp_users;-- breaks out of the value list. When an administrator later imports that export file, the import handler in src/Admin/Data_Import.php reads the uploaded SQL with file_get_contents, performs only a superficial header check, splits on semicolons, and executes each statement via $wpdb->query with no validation of table names or statement types. Additionally, any authenticated user with manage_koko_analytics can upload an arbitrary .sql file and have it executed in the same permissive way. Combined, attacker-controlled input flows from the tracking endpoint into exported SQL and through the import execution sink, or directly via malicious uploads, enabling arbitrary SQL execution. In a worst-case scenario, attackers can achieve arbitrary SQL execution on the WordPress database, allowing deletion of core tables (e.g., wp_users), insertion of backdoor administrator accounts, or other destructive/privilege-escalating actions. Version 2.1.3 patches the issue.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/20/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-22850 affects Koko Analytics, an open-source WordPress analytics plugin that has been found to contain critical security flaws in versions prior to 2.1.3. This vulnerability stems from inadequate input sanitization and improper SQL query construction within the plugin's data handling mechanisms, creating a pathway for arbitrary SQL injection attacks. The core issue manifests through the plugin's public tracking endpoint located at src/Resources/functions/collect.php, which accepts unauthenticated input parameters including path values (pa) and referrer values (r) without proper sanitization. These unescaped values are subsequently stored verbatim within the analytics database tables, establishing the initial foothold for exploitation.
The exploitation chain begins with attackers submitting maliciously crafted path parameters that contain SQL injection payloads directly through the tracking endpoint. When an attacker submits a path value such as "),('999','x');DROP TABLE wp_users;-- the payload successfully breaks out of the standard SQL value list construction. This crafted input gets stored in the database and becomes part of the export functionality within src/Admin/Data_Export.php, which writes these stored values directly into SQL INSERT statements without any escaping or sanitization. The vulnerability is compounded by the admin import logic found in src/Admin/Data_Import.php, which processes uploaded SQL files using file_get_contents to read the content and then splits the content on semicolons to execute each statement through $wpdb->query without performing any validation of statement types or table names. This permissive import mechanism allows for direct execution of malicious SQL commands against the WordPress database.
The attack surface is significantly broadened by the fact that both unauthenticated visitors and authenticated users with the manage_koko_analytics capability can leverage this vulnerability. Unauthenticated users can directly exploit the tracking endpoint to inject malicious payloads, while authenticated users with appropriate permissions can upload arbitrary .sql files that are executed in exactly the same permissive manner. This dual attack vector creates multiple paths for exploitation and significantly reduces the barrier to successful compromise. The vulnerability directly maps to CWE-89, which describes improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.004 for Valid Accounts and T1046 for Network Service Scanning. The potential impact of successful exploitation includes complete database compromise, enabling attackers to delete critical tables such as wp_users, insert backdoor administrator accounts, or perform other privilege-escalating actions that can lead to full system compromise.
The remediation strategy involves upgrading to version 2.1.3 or later, which implements proper input sanitization and SQL escaping mechanisms throughout the plugin's data handling pipeline. The patch addresses the root cause by ensuring that all user-supplied input from the tracking endpoint is properly escaped before database storage, and that exported SQL content undergoes validation before being included in INSERT statements. Additionally, the import functionality now validates statement types and table names to prevent execution of destructive SQL commands, and implements proper file validation checks to prevent arbitrary file uploads. Security best practices for WordPress administrators include regularly updating plugins, monitoring database access logs, and implementing network-level protections such as WAF rules to detect and block suspicious SQL injection patterns. Organizations should also consider implementing database read-only accounts for WordPress applications and regularly auditing plugin permissions to minimize the potential impact of such vulnerabilities.