CVE-2026-23559 in XAPIinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 07/09/2026

[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.]


XAPI can configure different users with different roles, using Role Based Access Control. For more details, see:

https://docs.xenserver.com/en-us/xencenter/current-release/rbac-overview.html#rbac-roles

The pool-admin role is fully privileged. Notably, users with this role can also SSH into the host as root.

The other administrator roles are pool-operator, vm-power-admin and vm-admin, each of which are authorised to configure and manage various aspects of the system.

Some settings are inadequately restricted, and can be set by a lower privilege of administrator than expected.

* CVE-2026-23559: A vm-admin can set VBD.other_config:backend-local and turn arbitrary files in dom0 into VDIs (virtual disks) and give said disks to a VM they control. This is an arbitrary read and/or modify of files in dom0.

* CVE-2026-23560: A vm-admin can set VM.other-config:is_system_domain and mark a VM as a system domain. System domains are ignored and left running during certain other host/pool operations, and may be hidden from view in tooling.

* CVE-2026-23561: A vm-admin can set VM.other_config:storage_driver_domain and mark a VM as the storage domain for a particular host storage connection (PBD). Shutting down the VM can cause the PBD to be erroneously marked as unplugged when it is not.

* CVE-2026-23562: Configuration of PCI passthrough is normally restricted to the pool-admin role. However one API was missing this check, allowing a vm-admin access to unintended host hardware.

* CVE-2026-42486: A vm-admin can set the VM.platform:hvm_serial parameter, which should be restricted to the pool-admin role, as it can allow arbitrary dom0 file write.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 07/09/2026

The vulnerabilities described in this XAPI security assessment represent a series of privilege escalation and access control flaws within XenServer's Role Based Access Control implementation. These issues stem from inadequate authorization checks across multiple administrative roles, particularly affecting users with the vm-admin role who should not possess elevated privileges. The core problem lies in the inconsistent enforcement of access controls where certain configuration parameters that should be restricted to pool-admin level users can be manipulated by lower privilege administrators. This misconfiguration creates opportunities for unauthorized file system access, system domain manipulation, storage management disruption, and hardware passthrough control.

The technical exploitation of these vulnerabilities demonstrates a clear breakdown in the RBAC framework where administrative boundaries are crossed through API parameter manipulation. CVE-2026-23559 specifically allows vm-admin users to manipulate Virtual Block Devices by setting VBD.other_config:backend-local parameters, enabling arbitrary read and write access to dom0 filesystem elements. This represents a direct violation of the principle of least privilege and creates a path for data exfiltration or modification within the hypervisor environment. Similarly, CVE-2026-23560 permits vm-admin users to mark VMs as system domains through VM.other-config:is_system_domain manipulation, which can result in operational bypasses during host maintenance operations and tooling visibility issues.

CVE-2026-23561 introduces another critical flaw where the VM.other_config:storage_driver_domain parameter allows vm-admin users to manipulate storage domain assignments for PBD connections. This creates potential for storage management disruption and incorrect hardware state reporting when VM shutdowns trigger false unplugging of active storage connections. The vulnerability in PCI passthrough configuration (CVE-2026-23562) represents a particularly dangerous bypass where vm-admin users can access host hardware directly, potentially enabling privilege escalation to root level access on the underlying system. Finally, CVE-2026-42486 allows vm-admin users to set VM.platform:hvm_serial parameters that should be restricted to pool-admin level, creating potential for arbitrary dom0 file writes and further undermining the security boundaries between virtual machines and the hypervisor.

These vulnerabilities collectively represent a significant risk to XenServer environments as they enable lower privilege administrators to perform actions typically restricted to pool-admin users. The exploitation patterns align with common attack methodologies documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly under privilege escalation and persistence techniques. Each vulnerability contributes to a broader compromise of the system's security model through inadequate input validation and enforcement of access controls. The impact extends beyond simple unauthorized access to include operational disruption, data integrity compromises, and potential denial of service conditions that can affect entire pool operations.

The root cause analysis reveals a systematic failure in the implementation of RBAC controls where API endpoint authorization checks are either missing or improperly enforced for specific parameters. This represents a CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) vulnerability pattern that manifests across multiple related functions within the XAPI subsystem. The lack of consistent enforcement creates a cascading effect where one compromised parameter can lead to multiple downstream security issues. Organizations should prioritize immediate patching and implementation of additional monitoring controls to detect unauthorized parameter manipulation attempts, as these vulnerabilities can be exploited without requiring elevated privileges beyond what is normally expected in a properly configured RBAC environment.

Responsible

XEN

Reservation

01/14/2026

Disclosure

07/09/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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