CVE-2026-27181 in MajorDoMo
Summary
by MITRE • 02/19/2026
MajorDoMo (aka Major Domestic Module) allows unauthenticated arbitrary module uninstallation through the market module. The market module's admin() method reads gr('mode') from $_REQUEST and assigns it to $this->mode at the start of execution, making all mode-gated code paths reachable without authentication via the /objects/?module=market endpoint. The uninstall mode handler calls uninstallPlugin(), which deletes module records from the database, executes the module's uninstall() method via eval(), recursively deletes the module's directory and template files using removeTree(), and removes associated cycle scripts. An attacker can iterate through module names and wipe the entire MajorDoMo installation with a series of unauthenticated GET requests.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/21/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-27181 represents a critical security flaw in MajorDoMo, a popular home automation platform that suffers from an authentication bypass allowing unauthenticated arbitrary module uninstallation. This vulnerability resides within the market module's administrative interface, specifically in how it processes user input through the gr('mode') parameter extracted from the $_REQUEST superglobal. The flaw stems from the absence of proper authentication checks before executing mode-specific code paths, creating a direct attack vector through the /objects/?module=market endpoint that can be exploited by any remote attacker without requiring valid credentials. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-287, which addresses improper authentication issues, and demonstrates a clear path to privilege escalation through unauthorized administrative functionality.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploits the admin() method's handling of the mode parameter, where the system directly assigns $_REQUEST['mode'] to $this->mode without verifying user authentication status. This design flaw enables attackers to manipulate the application's execution flow by simply modifying the mode parameter in HTTP requests. When the uninstall mode is triggered, the system executes uninstallPlugin() function which performs a comprehensive deletion process including database record removal, execution of module-specific uninstallation code through eval(), recursive directory and file deletion via removeTree(), and cleanup of associated cycle scripts. The recursive nature of the file deletion operation combined with the lack of input validation creates a complete system compromise scenario where an attacker can systematically target and remove all modules from the installation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially devastating for any MajorDoMo installation. An attacker can execute a systematic uninstallation campaign by iterating through module names and sending sequential GET requests to the vulnerable endpoint, effectively wiping out the entire home automation platform. This attack scenario enables complete system destruction and data loss, as the uninstallation process removes not only the core module records but also all associated files, templates, and scripts that constitute the platform's functionality. The vulnerability creates a path for attackers to achieve persistent system compromise and can be leveraged for both destructive attacks and potential system takeover, as the removal of core modules can destabilize the entire automation environment and potentially provide attackers with additional attack surface for further exploitation.
The exploitation of this vulnerability requires minimal technical skill and can be automated, making it particularly dangerous for widespread deployment. Security practitioners should consider this issue in the context of ATT&CK technique T1070.004, which covers the use of system binary proxies to execute malicious code, and the broader category of privilege escalation attacks. Organizations using MajorDoMo should immediately implement mitigations including authentication enforcement for all administrative endpoints, input validation for mode parameters, and rate limiting on module-related requests. Additionally, the platform should be updated to prevent direct assignment of user-supplied input to execution paths and implement proper access control mechanisms to ensure that only authenticated administrators can access the uninstall functionality. The vulnerability highlights the critical importance of input sanitization and authentication controls in web applications, particularly those handling administrative operations that can result in complete system compromise.