CVE-2026-32628 in anything-llm
Summary
by MITRE • 03/16/2026
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, a SQL injection vulnerability in the built-in SQL Agent plugin allows any user who can invoke the agent to execute arbitrary SQL commands on connected databases. The getTableSchemaSql() method in all three database connectors (MySQL, PostgreSQL, MSSQL) constructs SQL queries using direct string concatenation of the table_name parameter without sanitization or parameterization.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/16/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-32628 represents a critical SQL injection flaw within AnythingLLM version 1.11.1 and earlier releases. This security weakness specifically targets the built-in SQL Agent plugin that enables users to interact with connected databases through natural language queries. The application's design allows users to invoke database operations through the agent interface, creating a pathway for malicious actors to exploit the underlying database connection directly. The vulnerability stems from improper input validation and query construction practices within the database connector components that handle MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Microsoft SQL Server connections.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability resides in the getTableSchemaSql() method across all three database connector implementations. This method demonstrates a classic case of insecure direct object reference and improper input sanitization where the table_name parameter is directly concatenated into SQL query strings without any form of parameterization or input validation. The flaw occurs at the application layer where user-supplied table names are immediately incorporated into database queries without proper escaping or prepared statement usage. This design pattern creates an environment where any user with access to the SQL Agent plugin can inject malicious SQL commands that will execute with the privileges of the database connection.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching for organizations using AnythingLLM in production environments. Any authenticated user who can invoke the SQL Agent plugin gains the ability to execute arbitrary SQL commands against connected databases, potentially leading to data exfiltration, data modification, privilege escalation, and complete database compromise. The vulnerability affects all database types supported by the application, meaning attackers can target MySQL, PostgreSQL, or MSSQL systems with a single exploitation vector. This creates a unified attack surface that can be leveraged across different database technologies, amplifying the potential damage and attack surface.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to CWE-89 SQL Injection, which is classified as a high-severity weakness in the Common Weakness Enumeration catalog. The flaw also aligns with ATT&CK technique T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS where attackers might use database access to pivot to other systems or extract sensitive data. The vulnerability represents a privilege escalation path since the SQL injection occurs within the context of database connections that typically have elevated privileges. Organizations should consider this vulnerability as a potential entry point for lateral movement attacks or as part of a broader exploitation campaign targeting database infrastructure.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should include immediate patching to AnythingLLM version 1.11.2 or later where the SQL injection flaw has been addressed through proper parameterization of database queries. Organizations should implement network segmentation to limit access to the SQL Agent plugin and database connections to only authorized personnel. Additionally, database connection credentials should be reviewed and restricted to minimum required privileges. The fix should involve implementing proper parameterized queries or prepared statements in the getTableSchemaSql() methods across all database connectors, ensuring that user-supplied table names are properly escaped or parameterized before inclusion in SQL commands. Security monitoring should be enhanced to detect unusual database query patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts.