CVE-2026-38059 in Evolution iQ-Series terminals
Summary
by MITRE • 07/10/2026
The iDirect iQ200 exposes the /api/identity and /api/ REST API endpoints without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can retrieve sensitive device information including the serial number, Device ID (DID), Terminal Private Key identifier (TPK), MAC address, and exact firmware version. The DID and TPK are used for satellite network authentication in the iDirect platform, potentially enabling terminal impersonation and network reconnaissance.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/10/2026
The vulnerability present in iDirect iQ200 devices represents a critical security flaw that violates fundamental principles of access control and information disclosure. This device exposes REST API endpoints /api/identity and /api/ without implementing any authentication mechanisms, creating an attack surface that allows unauthenticated remote adversaries to gain unauthorized access to sensitive operational data. The exposure of these endpoints constitutes a direct violation of security best practices and demonstrates inadequate security design in the device's network architecture.
The technical nature of this vulnerability stems from the absence of authentication checks at the application layer, specifically within the REST API implementation. According to CWE-306, this represents a missing authentication vulnerability where the system fails to properly authenticate users before granting access to protected resources. The exposed endpoints provide access to critical device identification information including serial numbers, Device IDs, Terminal Private Key identifiers, MAC addresses, and precise firmware versions. This information collection mechanism operates without any form of access control, authorization, or session management, making it trivial for attackers to harvest sensitive data through simple HTTP requests.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond mere information disclosure, creating significant risks for network security and device integrity. The Device ID and Terminal Private Key identifiers are specifically designed for satellite network authentication purposes within the iDirect platform ecosystem. When these credentials become publicly accessible, they enable sophisticated attack scenarios that align with ATT&CK technique T1566 for credential harvesting and T1082 for system information discovery. An attacker could potentially impersonate legitimate terminals within the satellite network, disrupt communications, or conduct reconnaissance activities that compromise the entire network infrastructure.
The exposure of exact firmware versions creates additional attack surface opportunities for exploitation, as adversaries can identify specific vulnerabilities associated with those firmware releases. This intelligence gathering capability enables attackers to develop targeted exploitation strategies against known weaknesses in the device's software stack. The MAC address information provides network mapping capabilities that could facilitate further attacks including network enumeration or man-in-the-middle positioning. The combination of these exposed identifiers creates a comprehensive reconnaissance tool for malicious actors seeking to compromise satellite communications networks.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including network segmentation to restrict access to these API endpoints, deployment of firewall rules to block unauthorized access, and consideration of device firmware updates if available. The fundamental requirement for authentication mechanisms should be enforced through proper access control implementation as specified in NIST SP 800-53 controls. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify similar unauthenticated access points within network infrastructure. Additionally, security monitoring should be implemented to detect unauthorized access attempts to exposed API endpoints and establish incident response procedures for potential exploitation of this vulnerability.