CVE-2026-41010 in BOSH Director
Summary
by MITRE • 06/04/2026
ReleaseJob#unpack builds job_dir = File.join(@release_dir, 'jobs', name) and job_tgz = File.join(@release_dir, 'jobs', "#{name}.tgz") where name returns @job_meta['name'], a value taken verbatim from the jobs: array of the attacker-supplied release.MF inside the uploaded tarball. These paths are then interpolated into a shell string: Bosh::Common::Exec.sh("tar -C #{job_dir} -xf #{job_tgz} 2>&1", :on_error => :return). Bosh::Common::Exec.sh executes via %x{#{command}} (bosh-common/lib/bosh/common/exec.rb:53), i.e. /bin/sh -c, so any shell metacharacters in name are interpreted. FileUtils.mkdir_p(job_dir) on line 49 creates the literal directory (no shell) and succeeds even when the name contains $()/;, so execution reaches the sh call.
Affected versions: - BOSH Director: all versions prior to v282.1.12 (inclusive); fixed in v282.1.12 or later
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/04/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical command injection flaw in the BOSH Director's job unpacking mechanism that arises from improper input validation and shell command construction. The vulnerability occurs during the ReleaseJob#unpack process where the system constructs file paths using user-supplied data from the release manifest without adequate sanitization. The job name parameter extracted from the jobs array within the attacker-controlled release manifest gets directly interpolated into a shell command string, creating an environment where maliciously crafted job names can execute arbitrary commands on the target system. The vulnerability stems from the fact that BOSH Director uses a shell-based execution method through Bosh::Common::Exec.sh which ultimately invokes system commands via %x{#{command}} in bosh-common/lib/bosh/common/exec.rb line 53, making it susceptible to shell metacharacter interpretation.
The technical exploitation pathway involves an attacker uploading a malicious release tarball containing a specially crafted job name that includes shell metacharacters such as semicolons, parentheses, or dollar signs. When the BOSH Director processes this release, it creates the job directory using FileUtils.mkdir_p which safely handles special characters, but then proceeds to execute the tar command with the attacker-controlled job name directly interpolated into the shell command string. This interpolation creates a command injection vector where the shell interprets the malicious characters as command separators or variable expansions, allowing arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the BOSH Director process. The vulnerability affects all BOSH Director versions prior to v282.1.12, indicating this was a widespread issue that persisted across multiple releases.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it provides attackers with arbitrary code execution capabilities on the BOSH Director system, which typically operates with elevated privileges and has access to sensitive deployment information. An attacker could potentially escalate their privileges to the full extent of the BOSH Director's access rights, including the ability to modify or delete deployments, access sensitive configuration data, or even compromise the entire BOSH infrastructure. This vulnerability directly aligns with CWE-78, which describes improper neutralization of special elements used in OS commands, and maps to ATT&CK technique T1059.001 for command and scripting interpreter. The vulnerability represents a critical security gap in the BOSH release management system where input validation fails to prevent shell metacharacter interpretation, effectively transforming legitimate system functionality into a weaponized attack vector.
The recommended mitigation strategy involves upgrading to BOSH Director version v282.1.12 or later, which implements proper input sanitization and validation for job names. Organizations should also implement additional defensive measures including restricting upload permissions, implementing strict input validation at multiple layers, and monitoring for unusual file naming patterns in uploaded releases. The fix addresses the core issue by ensuring that job names are properly escaped or validated before being used in shell command construction, preventing the injection of shell metacharacters. Security teams should also consider implementing network segmentation and access controls around BOSH Director systems to limit potential attack surfaces and reduce the impact of any successful exploitation attempts.