CVE-2026-41249 in CoreShop
Summary
by MITRE • 06/04/2026
CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/05/2026
This vulnerability exists within CoreShop's GitHub Actions workflow configuration where the static.yml file utilizes the pull_request_target trigger mechanism. The workflow executes a dangerous pattern by checking out code from the pull request head without proper verification, creating an execution environment that trusts unverified external code. The flaw specifically manifests when the workflow processes pull requests through the pull_request_target event which runs in the context of the base repository rather than the forked repository, yet still allows checkout of untrusted code from the head branch. This creates a critical security gap where any external attacker can craft a malicious pull request containing malicious code in the bin/console script that will execute with elevated privileges on the GitHub Actions runner.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability follows a well-documented attack pattern that aligns with CWE-470 and CWE-94, representing unsafe use of external input and improper neutralization of code in execution. The workflow configuration directly enables arbitrary code execution by executing the bin/console script from the unverified checkout, which constitutes a code injection vulnerability. The pull_request_target trigger combined with unchecked code execution creates an environment where attackers can inject malicious code that gets executed with the permissions of the GitHub Actions runner. This vulnerability directly maps to the ATT&CK technique T1059.001 for command and scripting interpreter execution and T1078.004 for valid accounts, as the malicious code runs with legitimate runner privileges. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it requires no authentication or prior access to the repository, making it an ideal target for automated exploitation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it allows attackers to compromise the entire CI/CD pipeline infrastructure. Any malicious pull request submitted to the repository can result in complete compromise of the GitHub Actions runner environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, code modification, or further lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure. The vulnerability affects all versions from 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1, representing a significant window of exposure where organizations using CoreShop were potentially vulnerable. The Pwn Request attack pattern makes this particularly concerning because it can be automated and does not require any special privileges or access to the repository itself. The compromised runner environment could be used to access secrets, credentials, or other sensitive information stored in the CI/CD environment.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term security posture improvements. The immediate fix involves removing or modifying the pull_request_target trigger in the static.yml workflow file to instead use the standard pull_request trigger, which properly isolates the execution environment. Organizations should implement proper code verification mechanisms including dependency verification, code scanning, and automated security checks before any code execution. The workflow should be updated to validate code integrity using cryptographic signatures or checksums before execution, and to avoid executing scripts from untrusted sources. Additionally, organizations should implement least privilege principles for GitHub Actions runners, ensuring that only necessary permissions are granted and that sensitive operations are properly isolated. The solution should also include monitoring and alerting for unusual workflow execution patterns and implementation of a comprehensive security scanning process that includes static analysis, dynamic analysis, and dependency checking to prevent similar vulnerabilities from being introduced in the future.