CVE-2026-47410 in praisonai-platform
Summary
by MITRE • 07/21/2026
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/21/2026
The PraisonAI Platform vulnerability represents a critical cryptographic weakness that undermines the entire authentication system of the multi-agent teams framework. This security flaw stems from an insecure default configuration where the JSON Web Token signing secret is hardcoded to the literal string "dev-secret-change-me" when the PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET environment variable remains unset. The vulnerability exists at the foundational level of the platform's identity management system, creating a pathway for unauthorized access that directly violates fundamental security principles.
The technical implementation flaw resides in the platform's configuration handling logic which fails to properly validate or enforce secure cryptographic defaults. The safety mechanism designed to prevent this insecure default behavior only activates when PLATFORM_ENV is not set to "dev", yet the default value of PLATFORM_ENV is explicitly configured as "dev". This creates a silent bypass condition where any deployment without explicit environment variable configuration automatically inherits the insecure default, effectively rendering the security check useless in production-like scenarios. The vulnerability demonstrates a classic case of inadequate input validation and configuration management that aligns with CWE-312 (Sensitive Data Exposure) and CWE-311 (Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data).
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching within the PraisonAI ecosystem. An attacker who gains access to the public source code can immediately extract the hardcoded secret and generate valid JWT tokens with arbitrary user claims, including administrative privileges. This allows for complete unauthorized access to any existing user account, including those with elevated workspace ownership and administrative rights. The vulnerability creates a persistent backdoor that remains active until the platform is properly updated, potentially enabling data theft, privilege escalation, and system compromise across all deployed instances using affected versions.
The attack vector leverages the public nature of source code repositories where the hardcoded secret is exposed in plain text within the application files. This exposure represents a failure to adhere to security best practices outlined in NIST SP 800-53 and OWASP Top Ten, particularly concerning credential management and secure configuration. The vulnerability also maps to ATT&CK technique T1566 (Phishing) and T1078 (Valid Accounts) as attackers can leverage the stolen credentials to maintain persistent access. Organizations deploying PraisonAI platforms without explicit security hardening measures face significant risk of unauthorized access, particularly in environments where source code is publicly accessible or when default configurations are not properly overridden.
The remediation implemented in version 0.1.4 addresses this vulnerability by eliminating the hardcoded secret and enforcing proper configuration validation. This update ensures that JWT secrets must be explicitly provided through environment variables rather than relying on insecure defaults. Security practitioners should immediately implement this patch across all affected deployments and verify that proper cryptographic key management procedures are followed, including regular rotation of secrets and implementation of secure configuration management practices to prevent similar issues in future releases.