CVE-2026-52481 in SJRC F11 SJ-GPS-PRO
Summary
by MITRE • 08/18/2026
An issue in SJRC F11 SJ-GPS-PRO firmware build 2019-09-17 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the tcp_actions() function
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/18/2026
The vulnerability identified in the SJRC F11 SJ-GPS-PRO drone firmware, specifically within build version 2019-09-17, represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper handling of network traffic by the device's embedded operating system. This issue centers on the tcp_actions() function, which is responsible for processing incoming Transmission Control Protocol packets destined for the drone’s control interface or telemetry systems. The core technical deficiency lies in the lack of sufficient input validation and access control mechanisms within this specific handler routine. When a remote attacker sends specially crafted TCP requests to the open ports associated with the drone's management services, the function fails to properly sanitize or verify the source credentials and request parameters before processing them. This oversight allows an unauthorized party to bypass authentication checks that should normally restrict sensitive data retrieval operations, effectively turning standard network communication channels into vectors for information disclosure.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories such as CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor and potentially CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The tcp_actions() function likely processes commands that return telemetry data, flight logs, or configuration details without verifying if the requester has established a legitimate authenticated session. In many embedded IoT devices like drones, developers often prioritize low latency and minimal overhead over robust security practices during initial firmware development phases. Consequently, functions handling network I/O may inadvertently expose internal state variables or memory contents to any entity capable of reaching the device on the network layer. The attacker does not need physical proximity if the drone is connected to an open Wi-Fi network or a compromised local area network, allowing for remote exploitation from anywhere within radio range and beyond via relay attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data leakage. By obtaining sensitive information such as flight paths, GPS coordinates, user credentials stored in configuration files, or proprietary algorithm parameters, an attacker can conduct sophisticated reconnaissance against the drone operator and their environment. This intelligence gathering phase is a precursor to more severe attacks under the MITRE ATT&CK framework, specifically mapping to T1078: Valid Accounts if authentication tokens are exposed, or T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie if session management data is compromised. Furthermore, knowledge of internal network topology and device configurations can facilitate lateral movement within a user's local infrastructure. For commercial operators using the drone for surveillance or logistics, this exposure poses significant privacy risks to individuals in the vicinity and compromises proprietary operational security protocols. The ability to extract such data remotely undermines the trust model required for safe autonomous operation and regulatory compliance regarding airspace safety and data protection standards like GDPR where applicable.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary solution involves applying the official firmware patch released by SJRC after September 2019, which likely includes input validation fixes and stricter access controls within the tcp_actions() function to ensure that sensitive data responses are gated behind proper authentication checks. In environments where updating firmware is not immediately feasible or possible due to legacy constraints, network segmentation should be implemented to isolate drone control networks from general corporate or residential traffic using VLANs and firewalls. Additionally, disabling unused network services and ports reduces the attack surface available for exploitation of this specific function. Operators must also enforce strong Wi-Fi security protocols such as WPA3 with AES encryption on any local access points used by the drone to prevent passive eavesdropping that could aid in crafting valid-looking but malicious requests. Regular security audits focusing on embedded device network stacks are essential to identify similar misconfigurations before they can be leveraged for information disclosure or further compromise.