CVE-2026-52851 in Traccar
Summary
by MITRE • 09/17/2026
Traccar is an open source GPS tracking system. Prior to 6.14.0, an authenticated, non-readonly user with access to an object usable in a permission pair can submit DELETE /api/permissions with an extra attacker-controlled JSON key. Permission(LinkedHashMap<String, Long>) in src/main/java/org/traccar/model/Permission.java validates only the first two keys, but DatabaseStorage.removePermission() in src/main/java/org/traccar/storage/DatabaseStorage.java concatenates every map key into the SQL WHERE clause as a column identifier. The extra key therefore becomes attacker-controlled SQL and provides a blind boolean or error oracle that can extract arbitrary database values, including administrator email, password hashes, and salts, or conditionally delete permission rows. Unauthenticated requests are rejected. This issue is fixed in 6.14.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/17/2026
Traccar is an open-source GPS tracking system widely deployed for fleet management and asset location monitoring. A critical security vulnerability exists within versions prior to 6.14.0, specifically involving the handling of permission objects during deletion operations. The flaw stems from improper validation of input data in the API endpoint responsible for removing permissions. While the application enforces authentication and restricts access to non-readonly users with specific object-level permissions, it fails to sanitize or strictly validate all fields within the JSON payload submitted by the client. This oversight allows an authenticated attacker who has been granted permission to manage a target resource to inject malicious content into SQL queries through parameter manipulation rather than direct input in query parameters.
The technical root cause lies in the discrepancy between data validation and database interaction logic. The Permission model class validates only the first two keys of the incoming JSON object, assuming that any additional fields are irrelevant or safe for deletion requests. However, when the DatabaseStorage component processes this request to remove a permission record, it iterates over all key-value pairs in the map. It concatenates every key directly into the SQL WHERE clause as a column identifier without proper escaping or parameterization. This behavior creates a classic blind boolean-based and error-based SQL injection vector. Because the injected content is treated as part of the query structure rather than data, it allows for sophisticated exploitation techniques that rely on observing differences in application responses to infer database contents.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for full database compromise through blind extraction methods. An attacker can leverage the boolean or error oracle provided by the injection point to extract arbitrary sensitive information from the underlying database schema. This includes extracting administrator email addresses, password hashes, and cryptographic salts stored in user tables. By carefully crafting payloads that trigger conditional logic based on these extracted values, an attacker can reconstruct administrative credentials without ever needing direct access to those fields via standard API responses. Furthermore, beyond data exfiltration, the injection capability allows for destructive actions such as conditionally deleting permission rows, which could disrupt system functionality or escalate privileges by removing security constraints for other users if the database structure permits it through complex query manipulation.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command and falls under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command Scripting, specifically via injection mechanisms that manipulate backend processes. It also relates to CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information if error-based extraction is utilized effectively. The attack requires authentication, which limits the threat model to insider threats or compromised user accounts rather than unauthenticated remote attackers. However, given that many organizations may have multiple users with varying levels of access, even a non-administrative account can serve as an entry point for significant data breaches and system integrity violations.
To mitigate this risk, administrators must upgrade Traccar to version 6.14.0 or later immediately upon availability. This release addresses the validation logic by ensuring that only expected fields are processed during permission deletion operations. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, network-level controls such as Web Application Firewalls can be configured to detect and block SQL injection patterns in JSON payloads targeting this specific API endpoint. Additionally, implementing strict input validation on all server-side components regardless of client-supplied metadata is essential for defense-in-depth strategies. Regular security audits focusing on ORM usage and dynamic query construction practices should also be conducted to prevent similar vulnerabilities arising from inconsistent handling of untrusted data across different parts of the application logic.