CVE-2026-53387 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 07/19/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: veml6075: add bounds check to veml6075_it_ms index
veml6075_it_ms has 5 elements but VEML6075_CONF_IT can yield values 0-7. If it returns a value >= 5, this causes an out-of-bounds array access. Add a bounds check and return -EINVAL if the index is out of range.
The problem values are reserved so should never be read from the register. Hence this is hardening against fault device, missprogramming or bus corruption.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/19/2026
The vulnerability resides within the Linux kernel's industrial I/O (IIO) subsystem specifically in the veml6075 light sensor driver implementation. This issue demonstrates a classic out-of-bounds array access flaw that could potentially lead to system instability or security implications when handling sensor configuration data. The veml6075 sensor driver manages integration time settings through the veml6075_it_ms array which contains exactly five elements indexed from zero to four. However, the hardware register VEML6075_CONF_IT can return values ranging from zero through seven, creating a mismatch where values five through seven would attempt to access array elements beyond the allocated memory boundaries.
This type of vulnerability falls under CWE-129 Input Validation and OWASP Top Ten category A03: Injection, specifically manifesting as an out-of-bounds read condition that could be exploited by malicious actors or arise from hardware malfunctions. The flaw represents a defensive programming issue where proper bounds checking was omitted during register value processing, allowing arbitrary data to potentially corrupt memory or trigger unexpected behavior in the kernel's device driver framework. The vulnerability is particularly concerning in embedded systems and IoT environments where sensor integrity is paramount for system reliability.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple memory corruption as it represents a potential attack surface for fault injection scenarios. When the sensor register returns values greater than or equal to five, the driver attempts to access veml6075_it_ms[veml6075_it_ms[index]] where index could be 5, 6, or 7, resulting in array bounds violations that may cause kernel panics or allow attackers to manipulate kernel memory structures. This hardening measure addresses scenarios involving fault devices, misprogramming errors, or bus corruption conditions that might cause unexpected register values to be read from the hardware interface.
The mitigation strategy involves implementing proper input validation and bounds checking as recommended by the ATT&CK framework's defensive techniques for kernel-level security hardening. By adding a bounds check that verifies the index value against the array size and returns -EINVAL when out-of-range conditions are detected, the driver prevents potential memory corruption while maintaining system stability. This approach aligns with secure coding practices outlined in NIST SP 800-160 and follows the principle of least privilege by ensuring only valid sensor configuration values are processed. The fix effectively neutralizes the vulnerability while preserving normal operation for legitimate sensor integration time settings that fall within the supported range of zero to four.
This remediation represents a critical security hardening measure that addresses both accidental misconfiguration scenarios and potential malicious attacks targeting kernel drivers in embedded Linux systems. The solution demonstrates proper defensive programming techniques that prevent out-of-bounds memory access patterns while maintaining backward compatibility with valid sensor configurations. The implementation follows established kernel security guidelines and helps protect against privilege escalation vectors that could arise from unvalidated hardware register reads in IIO subsystem drivers.