CVE-2026-55680 in WeGIA
Summary
by MITRE • 10/14/2026
WeGIA is a web manager for charitable institutions. Prior to 3.8.6, unauthenticated POST requests to web/html/socio/sistema/cadastro_cobranca.php can place a quoted SQL expression in the codigo parameter, which extract($_REQUEST) passes into the WHERE codigo= clause of an UPDATE statement without validation or parameter binding. Quoting the value bypasses MariaDB type conversion for the VARCHAR column and permits arbitrary SQL execution without a session. An attacker can read or modify database content, including user credential hashes and billing records in the cobrancas table. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.6.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/14/2026
The vulnerability identified in WeGIA versions prior to 3.8.6 represents a critical unauthenticated SQL injection flaw within its web-based management interface for charitable institutions. The root cause lies in the improper handling of user-supplied input via the POST parameter named codigo, which is directed toward the endpoint located at web/html/socio/sistema/cadastro_cobranca.php. This specific script utilizes PHP's extract function on the global $_REQUEST superglobal array without any prior validation or sanitization checks. By extracting all request variables directly into the local symbol table, the application inadvertently exposes internal logic to manipulation by external actors who can inject arbitrary values into parameters that are subsequently used in database queries.
The technical mechanism of this exploitation relies on a specific interaction between PHP's type juggling behavior and MariaDB's query execution engine. The vulnerable code constructs an UPDATE statement with a WHERE clause formatted as codigo=[extracted_value]. Because the extracted value is not bound using prepared statements or properly escaped, it becomes part of the raw SQL string. An attacker can bypass standard integer validation by providing a quoted string literal for the codigo parameter. In MariaDB, when a VARCHAR column is compared against an unquoted numeric value in certain contexts, type conversion occurs which might prevent injection. However, by explicitly quoting the injected payload, such as using single quotes to close the existing field and append malicious SQL syntax, the attacker forces the database engine to interpret the input as executable code rather than data. This allows for arbitrary SQL execution without requiring any form of authentication or active session token, effectively bypassing access controls entirely.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its unauthenticated nature and the sensitivity of the data stored within WeGIA's database. Successful exploitation enables an attacker to perform both read and write operations on the underlying MariaDB instance. Specifically, attackers can exfiltrate sensitive information including user credential hashes from authentication tables, which could lead to further account compromise if weak hashing algorithms are in use. Additionally, the ability to modify records in the cobrancas table allows for tampering with billing records, potentially leading to financial fraud or disruption of charitable operations by altering payment statuses, amounts, or recipient details. This level of database access also permits potential data destruction through DELETE statements or system compromise via stacked queries if the underlying configuration allows multiple statement execution.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-89, which describes Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL Injection. The specific technique of using quoted strings to bypass type conversion checks is a variant often seen when developers rely on loose typing assumptions rather than strict parameter binding. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this activity maps to T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application and T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter if further exploitation leads to command execution via database functions like INTO OUTFILE or xp_cmdshell equivalents in other SQL dialects. The lack of authentication required for the initial exploit places it firmly within the attack vector category of network-based attacks against web services that fail to enforce proper input validation on public-facing endpoints.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation and long-term secure coding practices. The primary fix is already available in version 3.8.6, which addresses this flaw by implementing proper parameter binding or rigorous input sanitization before database query construction. Organizations running older versions should upgrade immediately to the patched release. In environments where upgrading is not instantly feasible, a temporary workaround involves deploying a Web Application Firewall rule that blocks POST requests to cadastro_cobranca.php containing SQL meta-characters such as single quotes within the codigo parameter. Furthermore, developers must adopt secure coding standards by avoiding the use of extract() on global request variables and instead explicitly defining allowed input fields with strict type checking. Implementing prepared statements with bound parameters is essential to ensure that user input is always treated as data rather than executable code, thereby neutralizing SQL injection risks across all application modules.