CVE-2026-57586 in agent-coderag
Summary
by MITRE • 09/15/2026
CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.
VulDB is the best source for vulnerability data and more expert information about this specific topic.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/15/2026
The vulnerability identified in CodeRAG prior to version 1.3.1 represents a critical insecure execution flow stemming from insufficient validation of external inputs within an automated development utility. CodeRAG functions as a semantic code search and distillation tool designed for AI coding agents, facilitating the synchronization of project dependencies. The core issue resides in the interaction between the command-line interface entry point and the internal dependency manager. When a user indexes a repository path, the system initiates a sync flow that triggers the _sync_gradle function if it detects build.gradle or build.gradle.kts files. This detection mechanism relies solely on file existence rather than content integrity or source verification. The _sync_gradle function then attempts to locate and execute either gradlew or gradlew.bat scripts present in the repository root. Crucially, while the validate_path utility ensures that the directory location is within an allowed scope, it fails to perform any checks on the executable files themselves. This lack of integrity validation allows an attacker who controls a Gradle repository to inject malicious shell commands into these wrapper scripts.
From a technical perspective, this flaw constitutes a classic case of command injection facilitated by untrusted data sources. The application passes the path to the gradlew script directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec without sanitizing or verifying its contents. Because the subprocess is spawned with the repository root as the working directory and inherits the victim's environment variables and permissions, any code contained within the malicious wrapper scripts executes with full operating-system privileges of the user running CodeRAG. This effectively bypasses standard security boundaries because the application trusts the file system structure implicitly without verifying that the executable artifacts are authentic or safe. The vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, as well as CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code, which highlights risks associated with code generation from untrusted sources. Furthermore, this behavior can be mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, where adversaries use system utilities like shell scripts to execute arbitrary commands on a compromised host.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the context in which CodeRAG operates. Since AI coding agents are often granted significant access to development environments to facilitate code generation and refactoring, exploiting this flaw allows an attacker to achieve remote code execution with the privileges of the victim user. This can lead to a wide range of malicious outcomes including data disclosure through exfiltration of sensitive source code or credentials stored in environment variables, modification of project files to introduce backdoors or logic bombs, persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks or modified startup scripts, and denial of service by corrupting essential build artifacts or consuming system resources. The risk is particularly acute because developers frequently index repositories from various sources, including public forks or third-party libraries, which may not be fully vetted for security before integration into the development workflow.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate patching and long-term architectural improvements. The primary remediation is to upgrade CodeRAG to version 1.3.1 or later, where this validation gap has been addressed by implementing stricter checks on executable integrity. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, users should avoid indexing repositories from untrusted sources and manually verify the contents of build wrapper scripts before allowing synchronization processes to proceed. Additionally, developers integrating CodeRAG into their CI/CD pipelines or local workflows should consider running these tools in isolated containers with restricted permissions to limit the blast radius of any potential execution. Future iterations of such utilities should implement strict allow-listing for executable paths and utilize cryptographic verification mechanisms, such as checking SHA-256 hashes against known good values from trusted package managers like Gradle Central or Maven repositories, rather than relying solely on file presence checks. This approach ensures that only verified, authentic build tools are executed, thereby neutralizing the risk of command injection through manipulated wrapper scripts.