CVE-2026-58002 in AVideo
Summary
by MITRE • 08/22/2026
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8b4c1f75540788d6b391740852ceb0732 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Users_affiliations add.json.php endpoint that allows authenticated users to forge two-party consent records by supplying the counterparty's agreement timestamp. Attackers can create a forged affiliation with status='a' and then reassign video ownership to arbitrary users through the videoAddNew.json.php endpoint, which trusts the forged affiliation as an authorization term.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/22/2026
The vulnerability identified in WWBN AVideo prior to commit 9c39d8c8b4c1f75540788d6b391740852ceb0732 represents a critical authorization bypass within the platform's affiliation and video management subsystems. This flaw specifically targets the Users_affiliations add.json.php endpoint, where the application fails to adequately validate or generate consent records for two-party agreements. Instead of enforcing strict cryptographic proof or server-side generation of timestamps that prove mutual agreement between parties, the system allows authenticated users to supply arbitrary counterparty agreement timestamps during the affiliation creation process. This design flaw effectively permits an attacker to forge valid-looking affiliation records by manipulating input data, thereby tricking the application into believing that a legitimate two-party consent has been established when it may not have occurred in reality.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe because the forged affiliation record serves as a foundational trust mechanism for subsequent actions within the platform. Once an attacker successfully creates an affiliation with a status indicating active agreement, typically denoted by status='a', they gain the ability to leverage this fabricated relationship to bypass access controls on other endpoints. Specifically, the videoAddNew.json.php endpoint relies heavily on these affiliation records to determine authorization permissions for video ownership transfers and additions. By trusting the forged affiliation as a valid authorization term, the application allows an authenticated user who has manipulated their affiliation status to reassign video ownership to arbitrary users or themselves without proper oversight or verification from the original content owner.
From a technical perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, and more specifically CWE-345, Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity. The root cause lies in the lack of server-side validation for the integrity of the affiliation data structure. The application accepts user-supplied timestamps as proof of consent without cross-referencing them against independent logs or requiring digital signatures that would prevent tampering. This allows an attacker to construct a malicious payload where they control both sides of the supposed agreement, effectively neutralizing the security boundary intended by the two-party consent model.
In terms of threat modeling and attack classification, this vulnerability maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it requires initial authentication but exploits misconfigured permissions within that authenticated session. Furthermore, the ability to reassign ownership constitutes a privilege escalation scenario where an attacker leverages trusted relationships to perform administrative actions outside their intended scope. The exploitation chain involves first crafting a malicious request to the affiliation endpoint with forged timestamps and then immediately utilizing the resulting valid-looking affiliation ID in requests to the video management endpoint to execute unauthorized ownership transfers.
Mitigation strategies must focus on hardening the validation logic within the affected endpoints. Developers should implement server-side generation of consent timestamps rather than accepting them from client inputs, ensuring that proof of agreement is derived from verifiable system events or cryptographic signatures signed by both parties' private keys if applicable. Additionally, implementing strict authorization checks at the videoAddNew.json.php endpoint to verify not just the existence of an affiliation but also its validity and recency relative to other security policies would prevent the exploitation of forged records. Regular code audits focusing on trust boundaries between related modules are essential to ensure that assumptions about data integrity held by one module, such as affiliations, do not compromise the security posture of dependent modules like video management.