CVE-2026-58372 in SeaweedFS
Summary
by MITRE • 06/30/2026
SeaweedFS before 4.34 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the S3 gateway DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler that allows authenticated S3 principals with write access to a single bucket to delete arbitrary objects in other tenants' buckets by supplying object keys containing ../ sequences in the DeleteObjects XML request body. Attackers can bypass authorization controls through a confused deputy condition, as the validateRequestPath middleware only inspects URL-captured path variables and never examines request-body keys, allowing the filer path to collapse directory traversal sequences and resolve deletions outside the authorized bucket.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/30/2026
SeaweedFS versions prior to 4.34 contain a critical path traversal vulnerability within its S3 gateway implementation that fundamentally undermines tenant isolation and authorization controls. This vulnerability exists in the DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler component where the system fails to properly validate object keys supplied in the XML request body, creating a confused deputy condition that allows authenticated users to escalate their privileges. The flaw specifically manifests when attackers craft malicious DeleteObjects requests containing ../ sequences in object key names, enabling them to traverse directory structures beyond their authorized bucket boundaries.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from a fundamental design flaw in the validateRequestPath middleware which only examines URL-captured path variables rather than inspecting the actual content of request bodies. This middleware acts as a security gate but fails to perform comprehensive validation of object keys that are passed within the XML payload of S3 delete operations. When the system processes these requests, it allows directory traversal sequences to collapse through the filer path resolution mechanism, effectively transforming seemingly innocuous paths into references that can access files outside the intended bucket scope.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching for multi-tenant deployments where isolation between different users or organizations is paramount. An authenticated S3 principal with write access to a single bucket can leverage this flaw to delete objects from other tenants' buckets, potentially causing data loss, service disruption, and unauthorized access to sensitive information. The vulnerability essentially breaks the fundamental security boundary that should exist between different tenant namespaces within the same SeaweedFS instance, allowing for cross-tenant data manipulation and potential exfiltration of confidential information.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-22 Path Traversal and represents a classic confused deputy problem where the system's authorization mechanism is bypassed through improper validation of user-supplied input. The flaw also maps to ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, as it exploits legitimate authenticated access to escalate privileges beyond intended boundaries, and T1485 Data Destruction, as it enables unauthorized deletion of critical data. Organizations using SeaweedFS in production environments must urgently address this issue through immediate patching to version 4.34 or later, while also implementing additional monitoring controls to detect anomalous deletion patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts.
The root cause analysis reveals that the system's security model relies on URL path validation alone rather than comprehensive input sanitization across all request components. This architectural weakness demonstrates the importance of defense-in-depth principles where multiple layers of validation should be implemented to prevent single points of failure in authorization mechanisms. Organizations should also consider implementing additional controls such as request body content filtering, enhanced logging of delete operations, and regular security assessments of API endpoints to identify similar vulnerabilities in other components of their storage infrastructure.