CVE-2026-58459 in gpsd
Summary
by MITRE • 07/09/2026
gpsd through release-3.27.5, fixed at commit 4c06658, contains a command injection vulnerability in gpsprof that allows attackers who control the GPS device subtype value to execute arbitrary shell commands by embedding backtick payloads in the gnuplot plot title without proper escaping. The subtype field sourced from a DEVICES JSON log entry or NMEA PGRMT sentence is written into a generated gnuplot program via a set title statement with only double-quote characters escaped, enabling arbitrary shell command execution as the user running gnuplot when the victim renders the generated plot through the gpsprof and gnuplot workflow.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/09/2026
This vulnerability exists within the gpsd software suite, specifically in the gpsprof utility that generates gnuplot visualization files for GPS data analysis. The flaw manifests as a command injection vulnerability in the handling of device subtype values, representing a critical security weakness that can be exploited by remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on systems running affected versions. The vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization when processing the subtype field which originates from either DEVICES JSON log entries or NMEA PGRMT sentences. These data sources are commonly used in GPS device communication protocols and represent legitimate inputs that should not be treated as executable code.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability occurs during the generation of gnuplot plot files where the subtype value is directly incorporated into a set title statement within the generated gnuplot script. The current implementation only escapes double-quote characters while leaving other potentially dangerous shell metacharacters unescaped, including backticks that can trigger command substitution in bash environments. This incomplete escaping mechanism allows attackers to embed malicious payloads using backtick syntax within the gnuplot title field, which then gets executed when the generated plot file is rendered by gnuplot. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it follows a classic command injection pattern where user-controllable input flows directly into shell execution contexts without proper sanitization.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple arbitrary code execution to potentially compromise entire systems running vulnerable versions of gpsd. Attackers can leverage this flaw to perform privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or system reconnaissance by executing commands with the privileges of the user running the gnuplot process. The attack vector is particularly dangerous in environments where GPS devices are connected to networked systems or when users may inadvertently render malicious plot files generated by compromised devices. This vulnerability affects not just individual systems but entire fleets of GPS monitoring equipment that rely on the gpsprof utility for data visualization, potentially allowing attackers to compromise multiple devices simultaneously through a single injection point.
The root cause of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-78, which specifically addresses improper neutralization of special elements used in OS commands, and represents a failure to implement proper input sanitization within the gpsd codebase. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1059.004 for Unix shell command injection and potentially T1068 for privilege escalation if the executing user has elevated permissions. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it exploits trust relationships between GPS device communication protocols and visualization tools, allowing attackers to bypass traditional network security controls by embedding malicious payloads within legitimate data streams. This makes detection more challenging as the attack appears to originate from legitimate GPS device communications rather than suspicious network traffic patterns.
Mitigation strategies should focus on immediate code fixes that properly escape all special shell characters when incorporating user-controllable input into gnuplot script generation. The recommended solution involves implementing comprehensive input sanitization that escapes or removes dangerous metacharacters including backticks, semicolons, pipes, and ampersands from the subtype field before insertion into the gnuplot title statement. System administrators should also implement network segmentation to limit access to GPS device communication interfaces and ensure that gnuplot rendering occurs in restricted environments with minimal privileges. Additionally, monitoring for suspicious gnuplot file generation patterns and implementing proper input validation at multiple layers of the gpsd processing pipeline can help detect potential exploitation attempts. The vulnerability highlights the importance of applying security principles such as the principle of least privilege and defense in depth when developing software that processes data from potentially untrusted sources, particularly in embedded systems and industrial environments where GPS monitoring is critical for operational integrity.