CVE-2026-58767 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 09/15/2026
In multiple functions of arm-smmu-v3.c, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/15/2026
The vulnerability identified within the arm-smmu-v3 driver represents a critical security flaw rooted in logical errors during memory management operations on ARM architecture systems equipped with an SMMU version 3 interface. As a cyber security specialist, it is essential to recognize that this component serves as the hardware abstraction layer for managing input-output memory management units (IOMMU), which are responsible for translating device-generated virtual addresses into physical addresses and enforcing access permissions. The presence of logic errors in multiple functions suggests a systemic issue within how the driver handles state transitions or boundary conditions when processing DMA requests, page table updates, or context invalidation sequences. These flaws allow an attacker to manipulate internal data structures or control flow paths that are not properly validated against expected system states, thereby bypassing intended security controls enforced by both the kernel and the hardware itself.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability falls squarely under CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow, as well as potentially CWE-20: Improper Input Validation if the logic errors stem from insufficient checks on device-provided descriptors or context identifiers. The core issue lies in the driver's failure to correctly enforce state consistency before allowing operations that modify memory mappings or interrupt handling configurations. In ARM SMMU-v3 implementations, proper isolation between devices and system memory is paramount for preventing unauthorized data access. When logic errors occur during functions such as stream ID mapping, context bank allocation, or fault handling routines, an attacker can exploit these gaps to alter the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) entries or page table walker behavior in ways that were not intended by the developers. This misalignment between expected and actual driver behavior creates a pathway for privilege escalation without requiring complex exploitation techniques beyond basic interaction with affected kernel interfaces.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it facilitates local escalation of privileges to system execution level. An attacker who gains initial access to the user space or even unprivileged process context can leverage these logic flaws to execute arbitrary code within the kernel ring buffer or manipulate critical subsystems such as interrupt controllers and DMA engines. Since no user interaction is required for exploitation, the attack vector is classified as local with low complexity from an ATT&CK perspective, specifically aligning with T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. The absence of a requirement for physical presence or social engineering makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous in multi-tenant environments, virtualized systems, or cloud infrastructure where isolation boundaries are critical. Successful exploitation could lead to complete compromise of the host system, allowing lateral movement across network segments, persistence through kernel-level rootkits, and exfiltration of sensitive data stored in memory regions previously protected by IOMMU restrictions.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate patching and long-term architectural improvements. The primary remediation involves applying vendor-supplied patches that address the specific logic errors identified in arm-smmu-v3.c functions responsible for context management and DMA translation operations. Organizations should prioritize updating their kernel versions to include these fixes, ensuring that all systems utilizing ARM-based hardware with SMMU v3 interfaces are protected. Additionally, implementing strict access controls on device drivers via LSM frameworks like SELinux or AppArmor can limit the attack surface by restricting which processes can interact with IOMMU-related sysfs entries or ioctl handlers. Regular auditing of kernel code for proper state validation and boundary checks is also recommended to prevent similar logic flaws from being introduced in future updates. Monitoring tools should be configured to detect anomalous DMA activity patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts, providing an additional layer of defense-in-depth against this class of vulnerabilities.