CVE-2026-59992 in azure
Summary
by MITRE • 08/20/2026
Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4, the first-party production media adapters pass attacker-controlled object keys to storage SDK upload and delete operations without enforcing the operator's configured mediaRoot. In packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts, createMediaHandler accepts req.query.key for a signed PutObject URL and the DELETE path uses req.query.media as the DeleteObjectCommand key. The same missing key-boundary check exists in packages/next-tinacms-dos/src/handlers.ts, packages/next-tinacms-azure/src/handlers.ts, and packages/next-tinacms-cloudinary/src/handlers.ts. An authenticated CMS editor can therefore create or delete objects anywhere the deployment's storage credential can reach, including other tenants' or non-media objects. These issues are fixed in next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/20/2026
The vulnerability affects several first-party production media adapters for TinaCMS, specifically versions prior to next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4. TinaCMS is a headless content management system that allows developers to build custom frontends with React while managing content through a flexible backend. These specific packages serve as adapters connecting the CMS to various cloud storage providers such as Amazon S3, DigitalOcean Spaces, Microsoft Azure Blob Storage, and Cloudinary. The core issue lies in how these adapters handle object keys provided by users during media upload and deletion operations. In a secure implementation, any user-supplied path or key should be strictly validated against an operator-defined root directory to ensure that files are only created or deleted within the intended storage bucket prefix. However, in the affected versions, this validation is absent.
Technically, the flaw manifests when authenticated CMS editors interact with the media management endpoints. For instance, in the S3 adapter located at packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts, the createMediaHandler function accepts a key parameter directly from req.query.key to generate signed PutObject URLs for uploading files. Similarly, the DELETE operation utilizes req.query.media as the key for the DeleteObjectCommand without verifying that this path remains within the configured mediaRoot boundary. This lack of input validation is not isolated to S3 but persists across all affected adapters including next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, and next-tinacms-cloudinary. By bypassing the expected directory constraints, an attacker can manipulate these parameters to target arbitrary locations within the storage account or container associated with the deployment credentials.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for data exfiltration, destruction, and lateral movement within cloud infrastructure. An authenticated user who should only have permission to manage media assets in a specific folder can instead create objects anywhere their IAM role permits writing. This includes overwriting critical configuration files, injecting malicious scripts into publicly accessible directories, or deleting essential system artifacts that could disrupt service availability. Furthermore, if the storage account hosts multiple tenants' data without proper isolation at the application level, an attacker from one tenant could access and modify another tenant's data, leading to significant confidentiality breaches. In multi-tenant environments where strict separation of duties is expected, this flaw effectively nullifies those boundaries by allowing direct manipulation of underlying storage objects beyond the intended scope.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory and CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path. From an ATT&CK perspective, it facilitates techniques related to Data Staged for Exfiltration over C2 Channels (T1048) if the attacker uploads malicious payloads to accessible locations, as well as Impact via Service Disruption through data deletion. The attack vector is primarily network-based and requires authentication, which classifies it under Initial Access or Privilege Escalation depending on the level of access granted to the compromised account. Because the vulnerability allows direct interaction with cloud storage APIs using valid credentials obtained from a web application session, it represents a critical risk for organizations relying on these integrations for content delivery and asset management.
Mitigation strategies primarily involve upgrading to the patched versions mentioned above where the key-boundary checks have been implemented. For environments that cannot immediately upgrade, administrators should implement strict WAF rules or reverse proxy configurations to sanitize query parameters before they reach the application logic. Additionally, enforcing least-privilege principles on IAM roles associated with these storage accounts is crucial; even if an attacker exploits this flaw, limiting write permissions to only specific prefixes can reduce the blast radius. Regular auditing of access logs in cloud storage providers can also help detect anomalous patterns such as rapid deletion or creation of objects outside expected directories, providing early warning signs of exploitation attempts.