CVE-2026-61798 in netty-incubator-codec-ohttp
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified within netty-incubator-codec-ohttp prior to version 0.0.23.Final represents a critical information disclosure flaw rooted in improper handling of sensitive cryptographic material during object serialization and exception reporting. Oblivious HTTP, or OHTTP, is an extension designed to enhance user privacy by preventing intermediaries from correlating requests with their destinations through encryption. The security model relies heavily on the confidentiality of private keys used within Hybrid Public Key Encryption schemes. However, several internal classes in the BoringSSL integration layer failed to mask sensitive data when converting objects to string representations or generating error messages. Specifically, the toString method for BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair inadvertently included its private parameters, while the toString method for BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter rendered the complete byte array of a private key whenever an internal flag indicated it was private. Additionally, the initialization routine for HPKE keys would include rejected private key bytes directly within exception messages if errors occurred during setup.
This technical flaw creates a significant risk in production environments where logging frameworks are configured to capture stack traces or object states. When developers log these affected objects or when runtime exceptions occur and are recorded by telemetry systems, the full binary content of HPKE private keys is written to logs in plaintext. This constitutes a severe breach of confidentiality because cryptographic keys must remain secret to maintain the integrity of encrypted communications. The presence of raw key material in log files exposes it to any individual with read access to those storage locations, including system administrators, DevOps engineers, or potentially malicious actors who have gained partial access to logging infrastructure such as centralized log aggregators like ELK stack or Splunk.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as the exposure of HPKE private keys allows attackers to decrypt previously captured OHTTP traffic if they can also obtain the corresponding public key and session parameters. Even without immediate decryption capabilities, the compromise of long-term private keys undermines the authenticity expectations of the protocol. Attackers could potentially impersonate legitimate clients or gateways in future sessions, leading to man-in-the-middle attacks where sensitive user data is intercepted and read by unauthorized parties. This directly contradicts the core privacy guarantees that OHTTP aims to provide, effectively nullifying its protective benefits for end-users whose requests are routed through compromised infrastructure.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-209, which describes the generation of an error message that includes sensitive information, and CWE-532, concerning information exposure through log files. In terms of adversary tactics, it relates to ATT&CK technique T1567.002, specifically exfiltration over alternative protocols or data from information repositories, as attackers often target logging systems due to their high concentration of sensitive operational data. The vulnerability highlights the importance of ensuring that cryptographic implementations do not leak internal state through standard debugging mechanisms like string conversion methods.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately upgrade netty-incubator-codec-ohttp to version 0.0.23.Final or later, where these toString and exception handling behaviors have been corrected to mask private key material. For environments that cannot update immediately due to dependency constraints, it is crucial to implement strict log filtering rules that redact any occurrences of base64-encoded binary data resembling HPKE keys from logs before they are persisted. Additionally, security teams should audit existing log archives for potential exposure of these keys and rotate all affected cryptographic keys if there is reasonable suspicion that the logs have been accessed by unauthorized entities. Regular review of logging configurations to ensure sensitive fields such as private keys, passwords, and tokens are never logged in plaintext remains a fundamental best practice in secure software development lifecycle management.