CVE-2026-62676 in Omnigent
Summary
by MITRE • 08/21/2026
Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, the timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a single background control operator. A gated git push or gh write hidden with these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the github.py write_repos and write_branches allowlist and the working_dir.py workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can therefore push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/21/2026
The vulnerability identified within Omnigent versions prior to 0.3.0 represents a critical security flaw rooted in insufficient input validation and parsing logic within its shell command execution policies. Omnigent functions as an open-source AI agent framework designed for orchestrating coding agents, relying heavily on strict policy enforcement to ensure that automated actions remain confined to authorized repositories and designated workspace directories. The core of the issue lies in the shared shell-command parser located at omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py, which is responsible for interpreting and validating commands before they are executed by underlying system processes or external services such as GitHub APIs. This parser was designed with a whitelist approach to security, meaning it explicitly allowed only specific command structures while rejecting others that did not match expected patterns. However, the implementation failed to account for several common shell syntax variations, including combined interpreter flags, wrappers like timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf, complex command substitutions using subshells or backticks, and single background control operators such as ampersands.
When an agent attempts to execute a git push operation or use the gh write tool hidden behind any of these unrecognized syntactic forms, the parser fails to identify it as a valid shell-command action. Consequently, the system does not trigger the associated security policies that would normally restrict access based on allowlists and workspace confinement rules. Specifically, the github.py module handles operations related to repository and branch interactions through write_repos and write_branches functions, which rely on strict allowlist checks to prevent unauthorized writes. Similarly, working_dir.py enforces workspace confinement by ensuring agents operate only within predefined directories. Because the parser returns no parsed operation for these malformed or complex command structures, both policy modules abstain from enforcing their restrictions, effectively treating the action as if it were not a restricted shell command at all. This logic error creates a bypass mechanism where security controls are silently skipped rather than actively blocking the request.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, allowing an authenticated agent or one subjected to prompt injection attacks to escalate privileges and escape intended constraints. An attacker who can influence the input fed to the AI agent could craft commands that exploit these parsing gaps to push code to repositories or branches not included in the allowlist. This undermines the integrity of version control systems managed by Omnigent, potentially leading to unauthorized code commits, supply chain attacks via compromised repositories, or data exfiltration if sensitive information is pushed outside controlled environments. Furthermore, the ability to escape workspace confinement means an agent could access files and directories beyond its designated scope, violating isolation principles essential for secure multi-tenant AI operations. This flaw aligns with CWE-20 Improper Input Validation, as the system fails to correctly validate complex input structures against expected security policies, and relates to ATT&CK technique T1653 Misuse of Configuration Settings, where misconfigured or bypassed restrictions lead to unauthorized access.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations using Omnigent must immediately upgrade to version 0.3.0 or later, which addresses the parsing deficiencies by expanding the shell-command parser to recognize and properly handle the previously ignored syntactic forms. Until an upgrade is feasible, administrators should implement strict network-level controls to limit outbound git and GitHub API traffic from agent environments, ensuring that only whitelisted endpoints are reachable. Additionally, deploying runtime application self-protection tools or host-based intrusion detection systems can help monitor for anomalous shell activity originating from AI agents. It is also advisable to review all existing prompts and agent configurations to minimize the risk of prompt injection attacks, which serve as a common vector for exploiting such parsing bypasses in LLM-driven frameworks. Regular security audits focusing on how external commands are parsed and validated within automated orchestration tools remain essential to maintaining robust defense-in-depth strategies against evolving AI-specific threats.