CVE-2026-63153 in Agora
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
Omnispace Agora Project before 26.10.0 contains a broken access control vulnerability in setAffectations() that allows authenticated attackers to insert access-right records for a caller-supplied target space without verifying the caller has rights to that space. Attackers can assign access affectations to spaces outside their own reach, breaking tenant isolation and granting unauthorized access to restricted spaces.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in Omnispace Agora Project versions prior to 26.10.0 represents a critical failure in server-side access control mechanisms, specifically within the setAffectations() function. This flaw allows authenticated users to manipulate permission assignments for resources that they do not own or have authorized access to. The core technical issue stems from insufficient validation of user privileges against the target resource identifier provided by the attacker. When an authenticated session initiates a request to modify affectations, the application fails to verify whether the current user possesses administrative rights or ownership over the specific space targeted in the payload. This lack of authorization check enables any valid user to bypass intended security boundaries and alter access control lists for arbitrary spaces within the system.
From a technical perspective, this is a classic example of an Insecure Direct Object Reference combined with Broken Access Control. The application relies on client-supplied input to determine which space's permissions are being modified but does not cross-reference this input against the authenticated user’s profile or tenant context. By exploiting this logic error, attackers can inject access-right records that grant themselves elevated privileges or assign rights to other malicious actors for spaces they should never be able to interact with. This effectively neutralizes the multi-tenancy architecture of the platform, as the isolation between different tenants is compromised through unauthorized permission modifications rather than direct data exfiltration.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential to break tenant isolation completely. In a SaaS or enterprise environment like Omnispace Agora Project, maintaining strict separation between customer data and configurations is paramount for compliance and security. An attacker who successfully exploits this flaw can gain unauthorized access to restricted spaces containing sensitive business logic, proprietary data, or critical infrastructure settings belonging to other tenants or the system administrator. This could lead to comprehensive data breaches, where confidential information from multiple organizations is exposed. Furthermore, attackers may use these elevated permissions to deploy malicious configurations, disrupt service availability by altering space parameters, or establish persistent backdoors within the application environment that are difficult to detect because they appear as legitimate administrative actions performed by a valid user account.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management and CWE-862 Missing Authorization in its fundamental nature of failing to enforce proper access rights. In terms of offensive security frameworks, it maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, as the exploitation requires initial authentication, and potentially T1078.003 Cloud Accounts if leveraged for lateral movement within a cloud environment. The ability to modify affectations also touches upon privilege escalation vectors where an attacker moves from a standard user role to an administrative or owner role over specific resources without proper oversight.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust server-side authorization checks before processing any requests that alter access control lists. Developers should ensure that the setAffectations() function validates not only the integrity of the input data but also verifies that the authenticated caller has explicit permission to modify affectations for the specific target space ID provided in the request. This validation must be performed against a trusted source, such as a database record linking users to their authorized spaces, rather than relying on client-side assertions or session tokens alone. Additionally, implementing principle of least privilege ensures that even if an attacker gains access, they are limited to operations relevant to their assigned role. Regular security audits and static application security testing focused on authorization logic can help identify similar flaws in other parts of the codebase before deployment.