CVE-2026-65089 in NemoClaw
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its status and logs plugin commands, where an attacker could cause OS command injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The NVIDIA NemoClaw platform for Linux presents a critical security risk due to the presence of operating system command injection vulnerabilities within its status and logs plugin commands. This flaw stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization mechanisms when processing user-supplied data passed to underlying shell interpreters or system call functions. In typical software architecture, plugins are designed to extend functionality by executing specific tasks based on configuration inputs. However, in this instance, the application fails to properly neutralize special characters that have significance within a command-line context, such as semicolons, ampersands, pipes, and backticks. This oversight allows an attacker who can interact with these endpoints to inject arbitrary operating system commands that are then executed by the privileged process running NemoClaw. The root cause is fundamentally tied to CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, a classic vulnerability pattern often found in applications that dynamically construct shell commands without rigorous escaping or whitelisting procedures for input parameters.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, primarily because the affected components likely run with elevated privileges to access system-level status information and log files. A successful exploitation enables an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host machine. This capability allows the adversary to install backdoors, create new administrative accounts, or modify critical system configurations. Beyond direct control of the operating system, the vulnerability facilitates data tampering by allowing unauthorized modification or deletion of sensitive log entries and status reports, thereby compromising the integrity of audit trails essential for compliance and forensic analysis. Furthermore, information disclosure is a significant consequence, as injected commands can be crafted to exfiltrate confidential data from the local filesystem or network configurations to an external server controlled by the attacker. The potential for denial of service also exists if malicious inputs cause resource exhaustion or crash critical system services associated with the NemoClaw monitoring infrastructure.
From a tactical perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically regarding the use of shell commands to execute payloads on compromised systems. It also relates to T1087 Account Discovery if the attacker uses injected commands to enumerate local user accounts for lateral movement or privilege escalation. The exploitation path typically involves identifying accessible endpoints within the NemoClaw interface that accept input for status queries or log retrieval operations. By injecting crafted payloads into these fields, an adversary can bypass standard authentication and authorization checks if they have at least basic access to the plugin interface, leveraging the trust relationship between the application and the operating system shell environment.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation of the codebase alongside defensive operational measures. The primary technical fix involves implementing strict input validation that rejects any non-alphanumeric characters except those explicitly required for legitimate functionality, or alternatively using parameterized APIs instead of direct string concatenation to build command lines. Developers should employ allow-listing techniques where only predefined valid inputs are accepted, ensuring that user data is never directly interpreted as executable code. Additionally, applying the principle of least privilege is crucial; if possible, the NemoClaw service should run under a restricted account with minimal permissions, limiting the blast radius in case an injection occurs. Organizations should also enforce network segmentation to restrict access to management interfaces and monitor for anomalous process executions originating from application processes using endpoint detection and response tools. Regular security audits and static code analysis focused on command injection patterns are recommended to prevent recurrence of such flaws in future updates.