CVE-2026-65219 in MBD-X12SPI
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
A flaw in the BMC RAKP+ implementation may allow an attacker to send a request followed by a specially crafted RAKP message and establish an RMCP+ session, which could then be used to execute commands.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The vulnerability described involves a critical weakness within the Baseboard Management Controller Remote Access Control Protocol Plus implementation, specifically concerning the authentication handshake mechanism known as RAKP or Remote Authentication Key Exchange Protocol. This protocol is fundamental to establishing secure management sessions in server hardware environments, allowing administrators and automated systems to interact with out-of-band management interfaces remotely. The flaw stems from an improper validation sequence within the BMC software that processes incoming connection requests. When a remote entity initiates contact, the system accepts the initial request without sufficiently verifying the integrity or authenticity of subsequent authentication messages before granting session privileges. This design oversight creates a window where an attacker can bypass standard security controls by sending a legitimate-looking request followed immediately by a specially crafted RAKP message that exploits this validation gap.
From a technical perspective, this issue represents a failure in proper input validation and state management during the cryptographic handshake process. The BMC is designed to expect a specific sequence of messages to verify identity using shared secrets or certificates. However, due to the flaw, the system proceeds to establish an RMCP+ session even when the authentication payload does not strictly conform to expected security parameters or lacks proper integrity checks. This allows an unauthenticated or maliciously authenticated actor to gain access to the management interface as if they had passed a legitimate verification process. The ability to forge these messages suggests that the implementation may be susceptible to replay attacks, message manipulation, or other cryptographic bypass techniques depending on the specific nature of the crafted payload and the underlying encryption standards employed by the BMC vendor.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it effectively neutralizes a primary layer of defense for physical server infrastructure. Once an attacker establishes an RMCP+ session through this flaw, they gain elevated access to the Baseboard Management Controller interface. This level of access typically allows for full control over the host system regardless of the operating system state running on the main CPU cores. An adversary could execute arbitrary commands, modify BIOS or UEFI settings, reset the server hardware remotely, view console output, or install persistent malware at a firmware level that survives OS reinstalls and reboots. This compromises not only the confidentiality and integrity of data stored on the affected systems but also their availability, as attackers can disrupt business operations by shutting down critical infrastructure without detection through standard network security monitoring tools designed to inspect higher-layer protocols rather than low-level management traffic.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication, where an actor is able to bypass authentication mechanisms due to flawed logic or implementation errors in the verification process. Furthermore, it relates to CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, as the system fails to adequately verify that the incoming RAKP messages originate from a trusted source and have not been tampered with during transmission. In terms of offensive security frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, this flaw facilitates techniques associated with Initial Access via Remote Services, specifically targeting management interfaces like IPMI or Redfish which often rely on RMCP+ for secure communication. Attackers can leverage this to establish a foothold within the network perimeter that is difficult to detect because traffic may appear legitimate if it mimics standard BMC handshake patterns closely enough to trigger the false positive in validation logic.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most effective solution is to apply vendor-provided firmware updates or patches that address the specific flaw in the RAKP implementation, ensuring that strict state machine enforcement prevents session establishment unless all authentication steps are completed correctly. In environments where patching is not immediately feasible, network segmentation should be enforced to restrict access to BMC interfaces solely from trusted management networks using firewalls and VLANs. Additionally, implementing strong password policies for default accounts and disabling unused remote services can reduce the attack surface. Organizations should also monitor for anomalous traffic patterns on RMCP+ ports, typically UDP port 623, looking for unusual handshake sequences or high volumes of connection attempts that may indicate exploitation activity. Regular audits of BMC configurations against industry benchmarks such as CIS Benchmarks will help ensure that security settings are hardened and aligned with best practices for out-of-band management security.