CVE-2026-66875 in Mira
Summary
by MITRE • 08/12/2026
In the Mira hormone monitor device firmware v1.7.1.47 build 01070147, a remote unauthenticated attacker within BLE range (approximately 10–30 meters) can silently rebind the device to an attacker-controlled account, extract stored hormone measurements in cleartext, cause a denial-of-service via malformed or undocumented command opcodes, and passively track the user via a static random BLE address that never rotates.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/12/2026
The Mira hormone monitor device represents a critical security vulnerability within the Internet of Things ecosystem where firmware version 1.7.1.47 build 01070147 exposes multiple attack vectors through its Bluetooth Low Energy implementation. This device operates as a medical monitoring tool that requires robust security controls given its sensitive data handling capabilities and personal health information storage. The vulnerability landscape becomes particularly concerning when considering that the device lacks proper authentication mechanisms for BLE operations, allowing any nearby attacker to establish unauthorized control over the device within a range of approximately 10-30 meters. This proximity requirement aligns with typical BLE security considerations where physical access or close-range proximity can enable exploitation.
The technical flaw manifests through several interconnected weaknesses including improper authentication handling for device re-binding operations, insecure data storage practices that store hormone measurements in cleartext format, and the absence of proper command validation mechanisms. The device accepts malformed or undocumented command opcodes without proper input sanitization, creating opportunities for denial-of-service attacks that can render the device unusable for legitimate users. Additionally, the implementation of a static random BLE address that never rotates violates fundamental security principles for privacy protection and tracking prevention. This design flaw enables persistent tracking of users across multiple sessions and locations, creating a significant privacy concern that extends beyond traditional security boundaries.
The operational impact of these vulnerabilities creates a comprehensive attack surface that can compromise both user privacy and device functionality. An attacker with BLE proximity can silently transfer device ownership to their own account, potentially gaining access to months or years of sensitive medical data including hormone measurement records that could be used for identity theft, insurance fraud, or other malicious purposes. The cleartext storage of hormone measurements represents a severe violation of data protection principles and creates an immediate risk for users who may not realize their health information is exposed. The denial-of-service capability further compounds the issue by potentially leaving users without access to critical health monitoring functionality when they need it most.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate security concerns and long-term architectural improvements within the device's firmware implementation. The most critical remediation involves implementing proper authentication mechanisms for all BLE operations including device re-binding procedures, ensuring that only authorized users can transfer device ownership. Data encryption at rest should be implemented to protect stored hormone measurements from unauthorized access, moving away from cleartext storage practices. Command validation must be strengthened to reject malformed or undocumented opcodes with appropriate error handling and logging mechanisms. The static BLE address implementation requires immediate replacement with a rotating address scheme that aligns with industry best practices for privacy protection. These remediations correspond directly to common weakness enumerations identified in CWE categories related to authentication failures, insecure data storage, and improper input validation. The attack surface analysis demonstrates patterns consistent with ATT&CK framework techniques targeting IoT devices through physical proximity attacks and credential compromise scenarios, emphasizing the need for comprehensive security controls beyond traditional network-based protections.