CVE-2026-67174 in Pivotick
Summary
by MITRE • 07/28/2026
Pivotick contains a DOM-based cross-site scripting vulnerability in its generic UI element resolution and icon-rendering utilities.
The tryResolveHTMLElement function treated any resolved string as HTML markup by assigning it to a <template> element through innerHTML. Strings derived from untrusted graph properties or custom rendering callbacks could therefore introduce arbitrary HTML or SVG elements into the live document. The vulnerable function was used by multiple UI components, including headers, property panels, extra panels, and tooltips.
Additionally, createIcon inserted caller-supplied svgIcon markup into a template without sanitization. An application integrating Pivotick and deriving icon markup from untrusted data could therefore expose a second script-execution path.
An unauthenticated attacker able to provide a crafted graph, property value, rendering result, or SVG icon could execute JavaScript in another user's browser when the affected content is displayed or interacted with. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to access information available to the victim, manipulate graph data or application state, and perform actions with the victim's privileges.
The patch changes string rendering to use textContent, requiring callers to explicitly return an Element when HTML rendering is intended. It also sanitizes SVG icon markup before inserting it into the DOM.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/28/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical dom-based cross-site scripting flaw within Pivotick's user interface rendering system that leverages improper handling of untrusted input in html element construction. The core technical issue resides in the tryResolveHTMLElement function which indiscriminately treats resolved strings as executable html markup through direct innerHTML assignment without any sanitization or validation processes. This pattern creates a persistent security weakness where strings originating from graph properties, custom rendering callbacks, or other user-controllable sources can be injected directly into the document object model, enabling arbitrary html and svg element insertion that bypasses standard browser security mechanisms.
The vulnerability affects multiple ui components throughout the application including headers, property panels, extra panels, and tooltips, creating widespread attack surface exposure. When combined with the createIcon function which processes caller-supplied svgIcon markup without sanitization, attackers gain access to two distinct execution paths for script injection. This dual vulnerability pathway significantly increases exploitability as it provides multiple vectors through which malicious code can be introduced into the user's browsing context. The attack requires only that an unauthenticated attacker can influence graph data, property values, rendering results, or svg icon definitions, making it particularly dangerous in collaborative environments where users may interact with content created by others.
According to cwes classification, this vulnerability maps directly to cwe-79 "cross-site scripting" with specific characteristics aligning with cwe-116 "improper encoding or escaping of output" and cwe-94 "execution of externally-supplied code." The attack pattern follows typical dom-based xss methodologies as outlined in the mitre att&ck framework under tactic t1059.007 "command and scripting interpreter: javascript' with techniques including t1203 'exploitation for client execution' and t1566 'credential access through exploitation'. The operational impact extends beyond simple information disclosure to include complete session hijacking capabilities, data manipulation, and privilege escalation potential since the injected scripts execute within the context of the victim's authenticated session.
The patch implementation addresses both vulnerability vectors by changing string rendering behavior from innerHTML assignment to textContent usage, forcing explicit element creation when html rendering is required. This defensive programming approach prevents automatic html interpretation while maintaining functionality through clear developer intent. Additionally, svg icon markup sanitization ensures that even when svg content is processed, it undergoes proper validation before dom insertion. These mitigations align with security best practices established in owasp top ten 2021 category a03:2021 "injection" and follow the principle of least privilege by eliminating automatic html interpretation of untrusted data. The changes effectively close both attack vectors while maintaining application functionality through explicit developer controls for html content generation.