CVE-2026-67360 in J2Store Extension
Summary
by MITRE • 08/21/2026
Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Cross-customer order replication in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.20, 4.0.0-4.0.20, 4.1.0-4.1.5 - An authenticated user could supply another customer's order_id to copy their cart contents and address data into the attacker's session. The CSRF token was validated but ownership was not checked.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/21/2026
The vulnerability identified in J2Store, a popular e-commerce extension for Joomla CMS, represents a critical failure in access control logic within versions 1.0.0 through 3.3.20 and 4.0.0 through 4.1.5. This flaw allows an authenticated user to perform cross-customer order replication by manipulating the order_id parameter during cart operations. Although the application correctly implements Cross-Site Request Forgery protections, ensuring that requests originate from legitimate sessions with valid tokens, it fails to verify whether the requesting user is the actual owner of the specified order or customer data. This discrepancy between authentication and authorization creates a significant security gap where identity verification does not translate into proper resource ownership validation.
From a technical perspective, the core issue lies in the server-side processing of cart synchronization requests. When an authenticated user initiates an action to copy items from one shopping cart to another, the application accepts an order_id as input without performing a secondary check against the session's associated customer ID or account details. Consequently, any logged-in user can supply the identifier of another customer’s pending order or transaction history. The system then proceeds to extract the line items and shipping address information linked to that external order_id and injects them into the attacker’s current shopping cart context. This behavior bypasses standard session isolation mechanisms because the validation logic relies solely on the presence of a valid CSRF token rather than enforcing strict ownership constraints on the data being accessed or modified.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is substantial for both merchants and customers operating within affected J2Store environments. For end-users, it results in a direct compromise of privacy and potentially financial security. Attackers can view sensitive personal information such as shipping addresses, which may include home locations or business details that should remain confidential. Furthermore, the ability to replicate cart contents means an attacker could potentially manipulate pricing structures if dynamic discounts are tied to specific order contexts, although the primary risk remains data leakage and unauthorized access to proprietary customer lists. For merchants, this undermines trust in their platform’s security posture and exposes them to potential regulatory penalties under data protection laws like GDPR or CCPA due to the exposure of personally identifiable information without consent.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, specifically highlighting failures where authorization checks are insufficient to prevent unauthorized access to resources belonging to other users. It also maps closely to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as the exploitation requires a legitimate user session but abuses it for unintended purposes by leveraging flawed logic rather than credential theft or privilege escalation in the traditional sense. The attack vector is classified under CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, since the order_id serves as an untrusted key that controls access to sensitive data without adequate ownership verification.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust server-side authorization checks immediately upon receipt of any request involving customer-specific data. Developers should ensure that every operation accessing or modifying cart contents verifies that the session’s user ID matches the owner ID associated with the referenced order_id. Additionally, applying input validation to restrict order_ids to those explicitly linked to the current authenticated user is essential. For administrators using affected versions, upgrading to a patched version of J2Store where this logic has been corrected is the primary remediation step. Until an update is applied, implementing web application firewall rules that monitor for anomalous patterns in cart manipulation requests may provide limited protection by detecting unusual frequency or volume of cross-user data access attempts.