CVE-2026-69160 in OpenList
Summary
by MITRE • 08/18/2026
OpenList a file list program that supports multiple storage. Prior to 4.2.4, the share creation and update checks in server/handles/sharing.go use strings.HasPrefix(requested_path, user.BasePath) without enforcing a directory separator boundary. An authenticated user with CanShare permission and a BasePath such as /base can submit a sibling path such as /base2/secret.txt, create a share for the out-of-scope file, and use the public share download or list handlers to read data outside the assigned directory. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.4.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/18/2026
The vulnerability identified in OpenList prior to version 4.2.4 represents a critical path traversal flaw rooted in insufficient input validation within the file sharing subsystem. Specifically, the server/handles/sharing.go module employs a string prefix check using strings.HasPrefix(requested_path, user.BasePath) to determine if a requested resource falls within an authorized directory scope. This implementation fails to enforce a strict boundary condition by not requiring that the path immediately following the BasePrefix be separated by a directory delimiter such as a forward slash. Consequently, this logic flaw allows for ambiguous path interpretation where sibling directories are incorrectly treated as subdirectories of the user's base path. For instance, if a user is assigned a BasePath of /base, the system erroneously considers paths like /base2/secret.txt to be within scope because they start with the string sequence "base".
This technical deficiency enables authenticated users possessing CanShare permissions to bypass access controls and create public shares for files located in sibling directories outside their intended scope. By exploiting this misconfiguration, an attacker can generate share links that point to sensitive data residing in adjacent folders on the server's file system. Once these maliciously created shares are generated, the user can leverage the public share download or list handlers to exfiltrate confidential information from resources they should not have access to. This effectively transforms a standard sharing feature into a mechanism for unauthorized data disclosure, compromising the confidentiality of files stored in directories that were logically isolated from the attacker's assigned workspace.
From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The failure to validate path boundaries constitutes a classic access control bypass where the system trusts user-supplied input without verifying that the resulting resource identifier remains within the permitted security context. In terms of offensive tactics, this exploitation vector corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1083 File and Directory Discovery, as it allows an attacker to enumerate and retrieve files outside their designated sandbox through legitimate application interfaces rather than direct file system access. The impact is severe for multi-tenant environments or shared hosting setups where strict isolation between user directories is required to maintain data privacy and integrity.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must upgrade OpenList to version 4.2.4 or later, which addresses the path validation logic by ensuring that a directory separator is present after the BasePath prefix during share creation and update operations. This ensures that only true subdirectories are considered within scope, preventing sibling paths from being misinterpreted as authorized resources. Additionally, implementing defense-in-depth strategies such as validating file access against actual filesystem permissions rather than relying solely on application-level path checks can provide an additional layer of security. Regular audits of sharing configurations and monitoring for unusual share creation patterns involving non-standard directory structures can also help detect potential exploitation attempts in environments where the patch has not yet been applied.