CVE-2026-6923 in NPCT7xx
Summary
by MITRE • 05/14/2026
A side-channel attack, which requires a physical presence to the TPM, can lead to extraction of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/15/2026
This vulnerability represents a sophisticated side-channel attack targeting Trusted Platform Module (TPM) implementations that can result in the extraction of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman cryptographic keys through physical access. The attack leverages timing variations, power consumption patterns, or electromagnetic emissions that occur during cryptographic operations within the TPM, specifically during ECDH key exchanges. Such side-channel vulnerabilities fall under the broader category of information leakage through physical means rather than traditional network-based attacks.
The technical flaw exploits the inherent physical characteristics of the TPM's cryptographic processing units, where the computational behavior during ECDH operations reveals information about the secret key material. Attackers with physical presence can monitor and analyze these side-channel signals to reconstruct the private ECDH key components. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it operates at the hardware level and can bypass traditional cryptographic protections, making it a significant concern for security-critical applications that rely on TPMs for key storage and cryptographic operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple key compromise, as it undermines the fundamental security assumptions of TPM-based systems. When an attacker successfully extracts ECDH keys, they can potentially decrypt communications, forge digital signatures, or impersonate legitimate system components. This compromise affects the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity guarantees that TPMs are designed to provide, particularly in environments where physical security is not strictly controlled. The vulnerability affects systems where TPMs are used for secure key storage, identity management, and cryptographic operations that rely on ECDH for key agreement protocols.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require a multi-layered approach combining physical security controls with cryptographic protections. Organizations should implement proper physical access controls to TPM-equipped devices, including restricted environments and continuous monitoring. Additionally, cryptographic implementations should incorporate countermeasures such as constant-time algorithms, randomization techniques, and noise injection to prevent side-channel information leakage. The use of hardware security modules with built-in side-channel resistance and regular security assessments of TPM implementations can help reduce exposure. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-310 and ATT&CK techniques related to side-channel attacks and credential access, emphasizing the need for comprehensive security frameworks that address both digital and physical attack vectors.