CVE-2026-69297 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE • 09/08/2026
Storing passwords in a recoverable format in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/08/2026
The vulnerability identified within the Microsoft Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server service involves the insecure storage of credentials, specifically allowing for their recovery from disk or memory artifacts. This flaw stems from the implementation choice where sensitive authentication data is stored in a format that can be decrypted or reconstructed by an entity with local access to the system. While the description notes disclosure over a network, the primary vector typically requires initial low-privilege access to query specific registry keys or extract secrets from the DHCP service memory space using tools like Mimikatz or similar credential dumping utilities. The core technical deficiency lies in the failure to utilize strong cryptographic hashing for stored passwords and instead relying on reversible encryption algorithms that are protected only by a system-level key, which is often accessible to administrators and potentially to attackers who have achieved local code execution through other means.
From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-256, the storage of passwords in a recoverable format, as well as CWE-798, which covers the use of hardcoded credentials or weak cryptographic keys that allow for unauthorized access. The operational impact is significant because DHCP servers often hold administrative privileges and are critical infrastructure components within enterprise networks. An attacker who exploits this flaw can obtain plaintext usernames and passwords associated with service accounts used by the DHCP server to authenticate against domain controllers or other network resources. This effectively bypasses traditional password-based authentication controls, allowing for lateral movement across the network without triggering typical brute-force detection mechanisms since no repeated login attempts are required during the extraction phase.
The exploitation of this vulnerability facilitates privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive network configurations. Once an attacker retrieves these credentials, they can impersonate legitimate service accounts to modify DHCP scopes, inject rogue DNS records via DHCP options, or authenticate to other systems that trust the compromised account. This undermines the integrity of IP address management and potentially enables man-in-the-middle attacks within the local subnet by redirecting traffic through malicious infrastructure controlled by the attacker. The risk is compounded in environments where service accounts are granted broad permissions across multiple domains or critical servers, amplifying the blast radius of a single compromised DHCP server.
Mitigation strategies must focus on reducing the attack surface and hardening credential storage practices. Administrators should ensure that the operating system and DHCP server components are updated to versions that address known weaknesses in credential handling, although Microsoft has historically classified some aspects of this behavior as by design for backward compatibility with legacy applications. To mitigate risk, organizations should enforce strict local administrator access controls, ensuring that only trusted personnel can interact with the DHCP service account credentials. Implementing Credential Guard on Windows Server environments is highly recommended, as it isolates secrets in a secure hardware-backed container, preventing tools from extracting them even if an attacker gains SYSTEM-level privileges. Additionally, network segmentation and monitoring for anomalous processes attempting to access sensitive registry keys or memory spaces can help detect exploitation attempts early. Regular auditing of service account permissions and rotating passwords periodically further reduces the window of opportunity for attackers who may have previously dumped credentials but are now blocked by updated secrets.