CVE-2026-69855 in Copilot
Summary
by MITRE • 08/21/2026
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Copilot in Azure allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/21/2026
The vulnerability identified as Server-Side Request Forgery within the context of Microsoft Copilot hosted on Azure represents a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity of cloud-based AI services. This specific class of attack exploits the trust relationship between the application server and internal or external networks, allowing an authenticated user to manipulate the backend system into making requests to unintended destinations. In this scenario, the attacker leverages their authorized access credentials to interact with the Copilot interface, but instead of performing legitimate queries, they craft inputs that cause the underlying service infrastructure to initiate HTTP or other network connections on behalf of the application. This capability effectively bypasses standard perimeter defenses because the traffic originates from a trusted internal source, allowing it to reach resources that are typically isolated from public internet access.
The technical mechanism behind this flaw involves insufficient validation and sanitization of user-supplied input before it is processed by the server-side components responsible for handling Copilot requests. When an authorized attacker submits a maliciously crafted URL or endpoint identifier, the application fails to adequately verify whether the target destination is within an allowed list of safe domains. Consequently, the server resolves and connects to the specified address, which can be directed toward internal metadata services, private API endpoints, or other sensitive network resources. This behavior aligns with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery as a vulnerability where a web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. The lack of strict allow-listing for outbound connections enables the attacker to probe internal network topology and access services that are not exposed to the public internet.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant, primarily centering on the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information stored within the Azure environment or associated with the tenant. By directing server-side requests to cloud metadata endpoints, such as those found in Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), an attacker can retrieve authentication tokens, access keys, and configuration details that are essential for further exploitation. This initial foothold allows the adversary to escalate privileges by obtaining credentials for other services within the subscription or tenant. Furthermore, if internal microservices or databases are accessible via private endpoints, the attacker may exfiltrate proprietary data, customer information, or intellectual property directly from these protected resources. The ability to disclose network information also aids in reconnaissance, enabling the attacker to map out the attack surface and identify additional vectors for compromise within the organization's cloud infrastructure.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strict input validation and robust access controls at both the application and network levels. Developers should implement a comprehensive allow-listing mechanism that restricts outbound requests from the Copilot service to only those domains explicitly required for its functionality, rejecting all other URLs by default. Network-level mitigations include configuring Azure Firewall or Virtual Network rules to block outbound traffic from compute instances hosting sensitive services to metadata endpoints and internal subnets unless absolutely necessary. Additionally, enabling Microsoft Defender for Cloud can help detect anomalous network egress patterns indicative of SSRF attacks. Organizations should also ensure that their Copilot configurations adhere to the principle of least privilege, limiting the permissions assigned to service accounts used by the application to minimize the potential damage if an exploit is successful. Regular security assessments and penetration testing focused on cloud-native vulnerabilities are essential to identify and remediate such flaws before they can be leveraged in real-world attacks aligned with ATT&CK techniques related to Cloud Discovery and Data Exfiltration over C2 channels.