CVE-2026-7003 in SynApps Runtime
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
WIT SynApps Runtime through 1.4.11 contains a hardcoded credentials vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to recover static OAuth clientId and clientSecret values embedded in JavaScript delivered to the frontend, such as in parameters.js. Attackers can extract these exposed application credentials to reproduce the application portion of the REDY authentication flow at the /web/api/v1/auth/token endpoint, undermining confidential-client assurance for the OAuth implementation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability identified within WIT SynApps Runtime versions up to 1.4.11 represents a critical failure in secure credential management and client-side security architecture. This flaw is classified as CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, which occurs when sensitive authentication data is permanently embedded into the source code or static assets rather than being managed through secure configuration stores or dynamic generation mechanisms. In this specific instance, the vulnerability manifests within JavaScript files delivered to the client browser, specifically in parameters.js and similar frontend resources. By embedding OAuth clientId and clientSecret values directly into these scripts, the application inadvertently exposes its most sensitive authentication tokens to any user who can access the web interface. This practice violates fundamental security principles regarding the separation of confidential data from public-facing code, as JavaScript executed in a browser environment is inherently visible and modifiable by end-users.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to perform credential harvesting without needing valid login credentials or exploiting complex injection flaws. Attackers can simply inspect the network traffic or view the page source of any interaction with the WIT SynApps Runtime interface to extract the static OAuth clientId and clientSecret values. Once these credentials are obtained, they provide a significant foothold for further malicious activity. The attacker can utilize these recovered tokens to impersonate the application itself during authentication flows. This undermines the core assurance model of confidential clients in OAuth 2.0 implementations, where it is assumed that only trusted servers possess the client secret. By exposing this secret, the system effectively treats its own backend services as public entities, allowing any actor with network access to interact with the API endpoints on behalf of the application.
The technical exploitation path involves targeting the /web/api/v1/auth/token endpoint using the stolen credentials. An attacker can construct valid OAuth token requests that mimic legitimate application behavior, thereby bypassing standard authentication checks designed to verify user identity or session validity. This capability enables unauthorized access to protected resources and APIs that rely on this authentication flow for authorization decisions. The impact extends beyond simple data exposure; it compromises the integrity of the entire security boundary established by the WIT SynApps Runtime. Attackers can potentially escalate privileges, manipulate application state, or exfiltrate sensitive data depending on what permissions are associated with the OAuth scopes granted to that client ID and secret combination. This scenario aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, as attackers leverage legitimate credentials obtained through improper storage practices rather than creating new unauthorized accounts.
Mitigation strategies must focus immediately on removing hardcoded secrets from frontend codebases. The primary remediation step is to refactor the authentication flow so that sensitive operations requiring a client secret are performed exclusively server-side. If the application requires OAuth 2.0 confidential client capabilities, it should utilize PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) where possible to mitigate authorization code interception attacks, although this does not fully resolve the issue of exposed secrets if they remain in static assets. The clientId and clientSecret must be migrated to secure server-side configuration files or environment variables that are never transmitted to the browser. Additionally, implementing strict Content Security Policy headers can help restrict how scripts execute and reduce the risk of data exfiltration via malicious third-party scripts, although this is a compensating control rather than a fix for the root cause. Regular security audits and static application security testing should be employed to detect such hard-coded credentials before deployment into production environments.