CVE-2026-71459 in Ansible Automation Platform
Summary
by MITRE • 09/23/2026
JobJobEventsChildrenSummary view has no model/parent_model. ModelAccessPermission.check_get_permissions() falls through (returns True) for any authenticated user. The view uses raw get_object_or_404(Job, pk) without DRF object-level permission check. Zero-privilege user reads event tree structure, event_processing_finished status, and enumerates Job IDs platform-wide via 200/404 oracle. Sibling endpoint /jobs/{id}/job_events/ correctly returns 403.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/23/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a critical authorization bypass within the application's job management subsystem, specifically affecting the JobEventsChildrenSummary view. This flaw arises from an incomplete implementation of access control logic in the backend framework layer. The core technical issue lies in the ModelAccessPermission.check_get_permissions method, which fails to enforce proper object-level checks for this specific endpoint. Instead of validating whether the authenticated user has explicit permissions associated with the target Job instance or its parent model context, the permission check falls through and returns True by default for any authenticated session. This design error effectively neutralizes the intended security controls that should restrict access based on role-based or resource-specific criteria.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to the lack of object-level filtering during data retrieval. The view utilizes a raw get_object_or_404 call targeting Job objects by primary key without invoking Django Rest Framework's standard object-level permission mechanisms. Consequently, an attacker with any valid authenticated account can query arbitrary job identifiers across the entire platform. By observing HTTP response codes, specifically distinguishing between 200 OK and 404 Not Found responses, the attacker can perform enumeration attacks to discover existing Job IDs even if they do not have direct access to view their contents. This side-channel information leakage allows for the mapping of internal system structures and active processes without requiring elevated privileges or administrative rights.
Furthermore, this vulnerability enables unauthorized disclosure of sensitive operational data. Once a valid Job ID is identified through enumeration, the attacker can retrieve detailed event tree structures and status indicators such as job_processing_finished flags. This exposure provides insight into the workflow state, processing timelines, and potentially internal system dependencies that should remain confidential to authorized personnel only. The inconsistency in security enforcement is highlighted by the sibling endpoint /jobs/{id}/job_events/, which correctly implements access controls and returns a 403 Forbidden response for unauthorized users. This discrepancy indicates an oversight in code review or implementation where one path was secured while another remained exposed, creating a predictable attack vector that exploits this specific inconsistency.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-285 Improper Authorization, as the application fails to enforce proper access controls on resources accessible via API endpoints. It also relates to CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site or Resource if the enumeration leads to further exploitation paths, though primarily it is an authorization failure. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK framework mapping, this behavior corresponds to T1087 Account Discovery and potentially T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie if session hijacking were combined with other flaws, but most directly fits within the Initial Access or Privilege Escalation tactics depending on whether low-privilege users gain access to high-value data. The ability to enumerate resources via 200/404 responses is a classic reconnaissance technique categorized under T1592 Gather Victim Host Information when used to map infrastructure, or more broadly as part of the Discovery phase where attackers gather information about available services and objects within an environment.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation steps must focus on enforcing consistent object-level permissions across all related endpoints. The ModelAccessPermission.check_get_permissions method should be refactored to explicitly validate user ownership or role-based access rights for each Job instance before returning a positive result. Developers should ensure that the get_object_or_404 call is wrapped within a permission check context provided by Django Rest Framework, such as using self.get_object() which triggers object-level permissions automatically when configured correctly. Additionally, implementing uniform permission classes across sibling endpoints like /jobs/{id}/job_events/ will prevent future inconsistencies where some paths are secured while others remain open. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools should be employed to detect similar patterns of missing authorization checks in other views that rely on raw database queries without proper framework-level validation layers.