CVE-2026-71506 in Dolibarr
Summary
by MITRE • 08/24/2026
Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains an improper authorization vulnerability in the payments REST API delete endpoint that allows authenticated attackers with invoice-deletion rights to permanently delete any payment record by bypassing the intended payment-issuance rights check. Attackers can exploit this misconfigured permission check to zero paid amounts on invoices and remove entries from accounting exports, causing financial data integrity loss.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2026
The vulnerability identified in Dolibarr versions prior to 24.0.0 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the application's REST API layer. Specifically, this flaw resides in the delete endpoint for payment records, where the system fails to enforce proper authorization checks relative to the specific resource being modified. While the application correctly restricts general invoice deletion based on user roles and permissions, it neglects to validate whether the authenticated user possesses the necessary rights to alter or remove associated financial transactions. This discrepancy creates a significant security gap that allows attackers with relatively low-level privileges, such as those granted only for deleting invoices, to escalate their impact by manipulating underlying payment data. The root cause is an improper authorization logic where the permission check for invoice deletion is incorrectly applied to or bypassed during the execution of payment record removal operations.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability falls under the category of broken access control, specifically aligning with CWE-284: Improper Access Control and CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The REST API endpoint responsible for deleting payments does not adequately verify that the user initiating the request has explicit permission to manage payment records or validate ownership of the specific financial entity being targeted. Consequently, an authenticated attacker can craft a malicious HTTP DELETE request targeting any payment record ID within the system. Because the backend logic relies on insufficient checks regarding the relationship between the invoice and its payments, or fails to check for separate payment management rights entirely, the server processes the deletion without raising an authorization error. This allows the removal of financial records that should be immutable by users with only invoice-level permissions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the direct effect on financial data integrity and accounting accuracy. By exploiting this flaw, attackers can permanently delete payment entries associated with invoices they are authorized to view or modify in other ways but not necessarily manage financially. This action effectively zeros out paid amounts on existing invoices, creating a discrepancy between recorded transactions and actual bank statements or ledgers. Furthermore, because these payments are removed from the system's internal records, they also disappear from automated accounting exports and reports. This leads to significant financial data integrity loss, potentially causing discrepancies in tax filings, audit trails, and revenue recognition processes. The ability to silently alter historical financial data without detection poses a substantial risk to organizational compliance and trustworthiness of financial reporting systems.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Dolibarr versions prior to 24.0.0 must upgrade immediately to version 24.0.0 or later, where the authorization logic for payment deletion has been corrected to enforce strict role-based access control. Until an upgrade is feasible, administrators should implement compensating controls such as restricting API endpoint access via network-level firewalls or reverse proxies if possible, and ensuring that users with invoice-deletion rights do not have unnecessary exposure to financial management modules. Additionally, enabling comprehensive audit logging for all payment-related operations can aid in detecting unauthorized deletion attempts post-exploitation. It is also recommended to review user roles and permissions regularly to ensure the principle of least privilege is strictly enforced across all administrative functions within the ERP system. This incident highlights the importance of rigorous testing of authorization logic across related entities, particularly when one entity (invoices) has a many-to-one relationship with another (payments), ensuring that actions on parent records do inadvertently affect child financial data without explicit permission checks.