CVE-2026-73780 in AOS-CX
Summary
by MITRE • 09/02/2026
A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of AOS-CX switches exposes some sessions to a lack of Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection. This could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary input against the affected interface if the attacker can convince an authenticated user of the interface to interact with a specially crafted URL.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/02/2026
The vulnerability identified in the web-based management interface of Aruba AOS-CX switches represents a significant security flaw rooted in inadequate implementation of Cross-Site Request Forgery protections. This specific weakness allows remote unauthenticated attackers to manipulate authenticated users into performing unintended actions on behalf of their current session. The core technical issue lies in the absence or insufficiency of anti-CSRF tokens, synchronization tokens, or other state-changing request validation mechanisms within the HTTP requests processed by the switch's management interface. When a user logs into the administrative portal, they establish an active session typically maintained via cookies or similar browser-stored credentials. If subsequent requests to modify configuration settings do not require additional verification that the request originated from the legitimate application itself rather than a third-party site, the integrity of these state-changing operations is compromised. This lack of protection means that any HTTP GET or POST request sent by an authenticated administrator can be forged and executed without their explicit knowledge or consent if they are tricked into visiting a malicious webpage crafted to trigger such requests automatically through hidden forms or image tags with side effects.
From an operational perspective, the impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the critical nature of network infrastructure management. An attacker who successfully exploits this flaw can alter fundamental configuration parameters of the AOS-CX switch without needing valid credentials for a specific user account at the moment of exploitation. This could involve changing routing protocols, modifying access control lists, disabling security features such as port security or DHCP snooping, or even redirecting traffic to malicious destinations. Such unauthorized modifications can lead to network outages, data interception, man-in-the-middle attacks, and complete loss of administrative control over the device. The risk is amplified because many enterprise networks rely on these switches for core connectivity, meaning that a successful exploit could have cascading effects across multiple segments of the organization's infrastructure. Furthermore, since the attack requires only social engineering to get an authenticated user to interact with a crafted URL, it bypasses traditional perimeter defenses and authentication controls entirely.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-352, which describes Cross-Site Request Forgery as a weakness where a web application executes unwanted state-changing requests on behalf of a user who is currently authenticated. It also maps directly to the MITRE ATT&CK framework under technique T1076, known as Remote File Inclusion or more broadly within the context of browser-based attacks, it falls under tactics involving execution and persistence through social engineering combined with exploitation of client-side vulnerabilities. The attacker leverages the trust that a web application places in incoming requests from an authenticated user's session to execute commands that should require explicit intent verification. This is particularly dangerous in network device management interfaces where actions are often irreversible or have profound systemic consequences, unlike typical web applications where CSRF might result in minor data changes like updating a profile picture or sending a message.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation efforts must focus on implementing robust anti-CSRF mechanisms within the AOS-CX web interface development lifecycle. This includes generating unique, unpredictable synchronization tokens for each user session and requiring these tokens to be submitted with every state-changing request, such as configuration updates or administrative actions. The server-side validation of these tokens ensures that requests originate from legitimate pages served by the application itself rather than external sources. Additionally, implementing strict SameSite cookie attributes can prevent browsers from sending cookies in cross-site contexts, thereby reducing the attack surface for CSRF attacks at the browser level. Developers should also ensure that sensitive operations are not performed via GET requests but only through POST or other methods with proper validation headers like Origin and Referer checking to verify the source of the request. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on web application logic flaws will help identify similar gaps in future updates, ensuring that administrative interfaces remain resilient against such manipulation techniques while maintaining high availability and integrity for network operations.