CVE-2026-75368 in SpaceDot
Summary
by MITRE • 08/24/2026
A stack overflow in the loadRawData function of SpaceDot AcubeSAT OBC software commit eaf90ec allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted ECSS TC message.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2026
The vulnerability identified within the SpaceDot AcubeSAT On-Board Computer (OBC) software represents a critical memory safety failure rooted in improper bounds checking during data ingestion processes. Specifically, the flaw resides in the loadRawData function, which is responsible for processing incoming telemetry and command packets from ground stations or other satellite subsystems. The underlying technical defect involves a classic stack-based buffer overflow condition where the application fails to validate the length of an ECSS TC (Telemetry Command) message before copying it into a fixed-size memory buffer on the call stack. When an attacker, typically acting as a malicious ground station operator or someone with access to uplink channels, supplies a crafted ECSS TC message containing payload data that exceeds the allocated buffer size, the excess bytes overwrite adjacent memory locations on the stack. This overwriting corrupts critical control structures such as return addresses and saved frame pointers, leading to unpredictable program behavior.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability primarily facilitates Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the satellite's core computing resources. In most embedded aerospace systems like those found in CubeSats, unhandled exceptions or memory corruption events often trigger hardware resets or watchdog timer expirations rather than allowing graceful error handling. Consequently, a successful exploitation attempt results in the immediate reboot of the OBC unit. For a small satellite operating in low Earth orbit, repeated reboots can lead to significant mission degradation, including loss of attitude control stability if the flight software does not properly restore state upon restart, interruption of data downlink operations, and potential failure to execute scheduled scientific experiments or orbital adjustments. The impact is compounded by the fact that many CubeSat missions operate with limited ground station contact windows, making recovery from such disruptions time-consuming and resource-intensive for mission control teams.
This vulnerability aligns closely with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID 121, which describes a stack-based buffer overflow resulting from copying data without proper bounds checking. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for space systems, this exploitation technique falls under T0863, known as Command and Control via Satellite Uplink, specifically within sub-techniques involving malicious command injection or resource exhaustion. The attacker leverages legitimate communication protocols to deliver a payload that exploits implementation flaws in the receiving software stack. While ECSS standards provide guidelines for message formatting and error handling, they do not inherently prevent programming errors such as buffer overflows; thus, the responsibility lies with the software developer to implement rigorous input validation mechanisms.
Mitigation strategies must focus on hardening the loadRawData function through strict adherence to secure coding practices essential for safety-critical embedded systems. The primary remediation involves implementing explicit length checks before any memory copy operations occur. Developers should verify that the size of the incoming ECSS TC message payload does not exceed the maximum capacity of the destination buffer, rejecting or truncating oversized messages with appropriate error codes rather than proceeding with unsafe copies. Additionally, employing compiler-level protections such as stack canaries (e.g., -fstack-protector in GCC) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), if supported by the target architecture, can mitigate exploitation success rates even if a buffer overflow occurs. Long-term architectural improvements should include migrating to safer memory management libraries or languages that enforce bounds checking automatically, thereby eliminating entire classes of memory corruption vulnerabilities at compile time rather than relying solely on runtime checks.