CVE-2026-75913 in CodeWhale
Summary
by MITRE • 08/18/2026
CodeWhale (codewhale / codewhale-tui) versions >= 0.8.41 and < 0.8.64 contain an argument injection vulnerability in the git_show tool. The model-supplied rev parameter is passed unvalidated into the git show argv without an --end-of-options sentinel, so a value beginning with --output= is interpreted as a git flag. Because the tool is registered as auto-approved and advertised as read-only, an attacker (via a malicious repository combined with prompt injection) can cause an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the invoking user, targeting sensitive files such as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc, or ~/.gitconfig. Fixed in 0.8.64 by adding rev validation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/18/2026
The vulnerability identified within CodeWhale versions ranging from 0.8.41 to just before 0.8.64 represents a critical argument injection flaw located specifically within the git_show tool component of the application suite. This security defect arises from improper handling of user-supplied input, where the model-generated rev parameter is passed directly into the command-line arguments for the git show utility without adequate sanitization or validation. The core technical failure lies in the absence of an end-of-options sentinel, such as --end-of-options, which serves to distinguish between legitimate argument values and actual command flags. Consequently, if a malicious actor provides a rev value that begins with double hyphens followed by known git options, specifically --output=, the underlying system interprets this string not as data but as a directive flag for the git binary itself.
This architectural oversight allows an attacker to manipulate the execution context of the tool significantly beyond its intended scope. Although CodeWhale is designed and advertised primarily as a read-only interface for repository analysis, and the specific tool in question is registered with auto-approved status to streamline workflow efficiency, this trust model becomes a liability when combined with prompt injection techniques. An adversary can craft a malicious git repository containing content that triggers the vulnerability through natural language prompts or structured data inputs processed by the AI component. By injecting payloads designed to exploit the argument parsing logic, the attacker effectively bypasses the read-only constraint, transforming a passive viewing tool into an active vector for arbitrary file system modifications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the privilege level at which it executes. Since the git_show tool runs with the privileges of the invoking user, any command injection results in actions performed under that same identity. This enables unauthorized writes to sensitive configuration and security files on the host system. Targeted attacks could overwrite ~/.ssh/authorized_keys to establish persistent remote access without password authentication, modify ~/.bashrc or other shell initialization scripts to execute malicious code upon login, or alter ~/.gitconfig to redirect git operations or exfiltrate credentials stored in plain text within those configurations. The ability to write arbitrary files at the user level facilitates further lateral movement and privilege escalation within the environment where CodeWhale is deployed.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS Command Injection. It also relates to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation, as the application fails to verify that the rev parameter contains only expected alphanumeric or hash characters rather than command-line flags. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this exploit scenario maps to ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically leveraging shell commands for execution, and potentially T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact if the file writes are used to deploy ransomware or other destructive payloads. The use of prompt injection as a delivery mechanism highlights the emerging risks associated with integrating AI models into operational toolchains where input sanitization is not rigorously enforced at the boundary between natural language processing and system command execution.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation through software updates and long-term architectural hardening. Users running affected versions of CodeWhale should upgrade to version 0.8.64 or later, which implements proper validation for the rev parameter to ensure it does not contain characters that could be interpreted as command-line flags. For environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should restrict access to the git_show tool and disable auto-approval settings to force manual review of all AI-generated commands before execution. Additionally, implementing strict input filtering at the application layer to reject any strings containing double hyphens or other special characters commonly used in command injection attacks can prevent exploitation. Security teams should also audit system permissions for users running CodeWhale, applying principle of least privilege by ensuring that the user account has minimal write access to critical configuration directories such as .ssh and home directory root files.