CVE-2026-76164 in AIL Framework
Summary
by MITRE • 08/19/2026
AIL Framework contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its crawler submission functionality. A low-privileged authenticated user with access to the crawler interface can submit an arbitrary URL for crawling without adequate validation of the destination host.
The crawler can therefore be instructed to make direct HTTP(S) requests to addresses that should not be reachable by application users, including loopback addresses, RFC1918 private networks, link-local addresses, and cloud metadata services such as 169.254.169.254.
Manual crawler tasks bypass the existing domain blacklist because they are assigned a non-zero priority, and ordinary IP literals are classified as web targets and fetched directly rather than through Tor or another proxy. Consequently, an attacker can use the AIL server as a network pivot to access services available from the server's network context.
Responses generated by these requests, including captured HTML, screenshots, and HAR data, can subsequently be accessed through the crawler interface. This makes the SSRF non-blind and may allow an attacker to disclose sensitive internal application data, service information, or cloud instance metadata and credentials.
The patch introduces validation that resolves crawler destinations and rejects URLs resolving to non-global IP addresses, addressing localhost, private-network, and link-local targets.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/19/2026
The AIL Framework contains a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability within its web crawling subsystem, specifically affecting the functionality used for submitting crawl tasks. This flaw allows an authenticated user with low privileges to manipulate the crawler into making HTTP or HTTPS requests to arbitrary destinations that are not intended to be accessible by application users. The core technical deficiency lies in the insufficient validation of destination hosts during the submission process. While the system attempts to restrict access through a domain blacklist, this mechanism is effectively bypassed when manual crawler tasks are assigned non-zero priority levels. In these scenarios, ordinary IP literals are treated as valid web targets and fetched directly via standard network connections rather than being routed through anonymizing proxies like Tor or other restricted pathways. This architectural oversight enables an attacker to leverage the AIL server as a network pivot point, allowing them to probe and interact with services available within the server's internal network context.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to its non-blind nature. When the crawler successfully retrieves content from targeted internal addresses, it captures various forms of data including HTML source code, visual screenshots, and HAR (HTTP Archive) files containing detailed request and response metadata. These results are subsequently made accessible through the standard crawler interface, providing a direct channel for information disclosure. An attacker can exploit this to enumerate sensitive internal application data, gather intelligence on running services such as version numbers or technology stacks, and potentially extract cloud instance metadata. Accessing endpoints like 169.254.169.254 is particularly dangerous in cloud environments, as these addresses often host APIs that provide temporary security credentials, IAM roles, and other sensitive configuration details essential for maintaining the integrity of cloud infrastructure.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws where a web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. Furthermore, from an offensive security perspective, this behavior corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1557, specifically Adversary-in-the-Middle or Lateral Tool Transfer scenarios where compromised systems are used to pivot across network segments. The ability to bypass domain blacklists by using IP literals and non-zero priority tasks highlights a failure in input validation logic that treats all inputs as potentially safe web targets without verifying their resolvability against global address space standards.
To mitigate this risk, the patch introduces rigorous destination validation mechanisms designed to resolve crawler URLs before processing them. The updated logic explicitly rejects any URL that resolves to non-global IP addresses, including loopback interfaces such as 127.0.0.1 or ::1, RFC1918 private network ranges like 10.x.x.x and 192.168.x.x, link-local addresses, and cloud metadata endpoints. By enforcing these restrictions at the resolution stage, the system prevents the crawler from initiating connections to internal resources regardless of how they are specified in the submission payload. Organizations should immediately apply this patch and review their access control policies to ensure that only authorized personnel can submit crawl tasks with elevated priority levels. Additionally implementing network-level controls such as firewall rules or egress filtering can provide defense-in-depth by blocking outbound requests from the application server to private IP ranges, further reducing the attack surface for potential SSRF exploitation attempts.