CVE-2026-76237 in stigmem
Summary
by MITRE • 08/19/2026
stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/19/2026
The vulnerability identified in stigmem-node versions prior to 0.9.0a12 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within multi-tenant environments, specifically classified as Broken Object Level Authorization or Cross-Tenant BOLA under the CWE-639 standard. This flaw resides primarily within the quarantine review endpoints located in routes/quarantine.py and affects systems running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant extension. The core technical deficiency stems from a lack of proper tenant isolation logic during data retrieval operations. Specifically, the list and count queries as well as the _get_quarantined_fact function failed to enforce a mandatory tenant_id predicate in their database filtering criteria. Furthermore, the underlying garden lookup mechanism was not scoped to restrict results to the specific tenant context associated with the authenticated user session. This architectural oversight means that the application does not verify whether the requesting entity has ownership or administrative rights over the specific quarantine records being accessed.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability allows for significant unauthorized data exposure and manipulation across organizational boundaries within a shared infrastructure. An attacker who possesses only basic tenant write capabilities can exploit these endpoints to enumerate quarantined facts belonging to other tenants on the same deployment. By manipulating request parameters or simply iterating through available identifiers, the adversary can retrieve sensitive information contained in those quarantine records. Beyond mere data exfiltration, the vulnerability permits active manipulation of security controls. The attacker is able to admit or reject quarantined facts for other tenants, effectively bypassing automated threat detection and response workflows established by victim organizations. This capability undermines the integrity of the security posture provided by stigmem-node, as it allows malicious actors to suppress alerts from competitors or partners while potentially introducing false positives or noise into their own environments.
The impact is strictly limited to multi-tenant deployments utilizing the specific plugin mentioned; default single-tenant installations are not susceptible because there is no concept of cross-tenant data sharing in those configurations. However, for organizations relying on stigmem-node as part of a shared threat intelligence platform, this flaw poses a severe risk to confidentiality and integrity. The ability to view other tenants' quarantined items exposes sensitive operational security details, such as indicators of compromise or internal network vulnerabilities that were previously isolated from external entities. Additionally, the capacity to alter quarantine states can disrupt incident response efforts for affected organizations, leading to potential delays in threat mitigation and increased exposure to ongoing attacks.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation through software updates and rigorous access control enforcement. The primary solution is to upgrade stigmem-node to version 0.9.0a12 or later, where the vendor has addressed these authorization flaws by implementing proper tenant-scoping for all quarantine-related database queries and lookups. Until an update can be applied, administrators should consider disabling the multi-tenant plugin if it is not strictly necessary for their deployment model, thereby reverting to a single-tenant architecture that does not expose cross-tenant data paths. Furthermore, organizations should implement strict input validation on all API endpoints related to quarantine management and ensure that every database operation explicitly includes tenant context verification in its query logic. Security monitoring tools should be configured to detect unusual patterns of access to quarantine endpoints by users who do not typically interact with such resources, which may indicate exploitation attempts aligned with ATT&CK technique T1530 Data from Cloud Storage or T1496 Resource Hijacking depending on the specific outcome of the exploit. Regular audits of role-based access control policies are also recommended to ensure that write capabilities do inadvertently grant broader read permissions than intended by the system design.