CVE-2026-76823 in OpenCTIinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/16/2026

OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260706.0, the logsWorkerConfig GraphQL query is authorized with the broad CONNECTORAPI capability and returns Elasticsearch connection details including elasticsearch_username, elasticsearch_password, elasticsearch_api_key, the URL, index, proxy, and TLS-verification setting. A holder of any connector API bearer token can retrieve this credential material. If the returned credentials are valid and Elasticsearch is reachable, the caller can directly read, modify, or delete OpenCTI indices and audit history outside application-layer role, marking, organization, and audit controls, with the practical impact bounded by the credentials' privileges and network reachability. This issue is fixed in version 7.260706.0.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026

OpenCTI serves as a critical open-source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables, relying heavily on secure access controls to protect sensitive data within its ecosystem. A significant security flaw was identified in versions prior to 7.260706.0 regarding the authorization logic applied to specific GraphQL queries. Specifically, the logsWorkerConfig query was improperly authorized using a broad CONNECTORAPI capability rather than requiring more granular or administrative-level permissions. This misconfiguration allowed any entity possessing a valid connector API bearer token to access sensitive configuration details that should have been restricted to higher-privileged users or internal system processes only.

The technical flaw centers on the excessive exposure of Elasticsearch connection parameters through this GraphQL endpoint. When queried, the logsWorkerConfig function returned critical credential material including the elasticsearch_username, elasticsearch_password, and elasticsearch_api_key, alongside network configuration details such as the URL, index name, proxy settings, and TLS verification status. This information effectively provided a direct pathway to interact with the underlying Elasticsearch database that powers OpenCTI's data storage and retrieval mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from an insufficient access control check during the GraphQL query execution phase, where the system failed to validate whether the requesting connector had legitimate business justification for accessing logging infrastructure credentials.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the direct nature of the exposed capabilities. An attacker who obtains a valid connector API token can leverage these leaked Elasticsearch credentials to bypass OpenCTI's application-layer security controls, including role-based access control, marking schemes, organizational boundaries, and audit logs. By connecting directly to the Elasticsearch instance using the provided username, password, or API key, an adversary gains the ability to read, modify, or delete intelligence data and historical records outside of the intended application context. This undermines the integrity and confidentiality of threat intelligence assets managed by the platform. The practical scope of this impact is bounded by the privileges associated with the leaked credentials and the network reachability between the attacker's infrastructure and the Elasticsearch service, but within those bounds, it represents a complete compromise of data security for that instance.

This vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control, as the system failed to restrict access to sensitive configuration information based on user roles or capabilities. Furthermore, from an offensive perspective, this flaw facilitates lateral movement and direct database interaction which can be mapped to ATT&CK techniques related to Credential Dumping and Data Exfiltration via non-application layer channels. The exposure of API keys and passwords allows for persistence and further exploitation without triggering typical application-level alerts that might monitor standard user interactions within the OpenCTI interface.

To mitigate this risk, organizations running OpenCTI must upgrade immediately to version 7.260706.0 or later where this authorization logic has been corrected. In addition to upgrading, administrators should rotate all Elasticsearch credentials associated with the affected instance, as they may have already been compromised if any connector tokens were exposed in logs or shared externally during the vulnerable period. It is also recommended to review network segmentation policies to ensure that Elasticsearch instances are not directly accessible from untrusted networks and to implement strict firewall rules limiting access to database ports only to authorized application servers. Regular auditing of GraphQL endpoint permissions and adherence to the principle of least privilege for all API capabilities will help prevent similar misconfigurations in future deployments.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

08/19/2026

Disclosure

11/16/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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