CVE-2026-77314 in Flyto Core
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, the MCP run_recipe tool in src/core/mcp_handler.py accepts a caller-controlled recipe_name that load_recipe() in src/cli/recipe.py appends to the src/recipes path without resolved-path containment. Parent-directory segments can therefore make Flyto load and execute a YAML workflow outside the bundled recipe directory, bypassing the boundary represented by list_recipes(). This does not necessarily provide unrestricted code execution because available workflow modules remain subject to Flyto's module policy, but it permits unintended execution of allowed browser, network, file, and data-processing modules. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in Flyto2 Core prior to version 2.26.8 represents a critical path traversal flaw within the MCP run_recipe tool located in src/core/mcp_handler.py. As an execution kernel designed for automation and AI-agent workflows, Flyto relies on strict boundaries to ensure that automated agents operate only within predefined, safe contexts. The core technical failure lies in how the system handles user-supplied input for the recipe_name parameter. When a request is made to execute a specific workflow, the application invokes load_recipe from src/cli/recipe.py, which concatenates the provided recipe_name directly onto the base path of the src/recipes directory without performing adequate validation or normalization of the file path. This lack of resolved-path containment allows an attacker to inject parent-directory traversal sequences, such as ../, into the input string. By manipulating this parameter, it is possible to escape the intended sandboxed directory and reference YAML workflow files located in arbitrary locations on the underlying filesystem that are accessible by the user running the Flyto process.
This architectural flaw effectively bypasses the list_recipes() function, which serves as a primary control mechanism for restricting available workflows to those bundled within the official recipe directory. The absence of proper path canonicalization means that boundary checks based solely on string prefix matching or simple inclusion are insufficient to prevent access outside the designated scope. Consequently, an attacker can force Flyto to load and execute configuration files from unintended locations. While this does not automatically equate to unrestricted arbitrary code execution due to existing module policies, it significantly expands the attack surface by allowing the invocation of workflows that were never intended for external use or testing. The operational impact is substantial because these externally loaded YAML workflows can still trigger allowed modules related to browser automation, network interactions, file system operations, and data processing. This means an attacker could potentially leverage legitimate functionality in unintended ways, leading to unauthorized data access, modification of sensitive files on the host system, or lateral movement within a network if the agent has appropriate permissions.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal. The exploitation technique involves manipulating input parameters to access resources outside their intended scope, which is also reflected in MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Command and Scripting Interpreter abuse or File and Directory Discovery depending on the specific outcome achieved by the malicious workflow execution. The vulnerability highlights a common pitfall in application development where trust is placed in high-level boundary definitions without ensuring that underlying file system operations are rigorously sanitized against relative path manipulation.
To mitigate this risk, it is imperative to upgrade Flyto2 Core to version 2.26.8 or later, which addresses the issue by implementing proper resolved-path containment checks within the load_recipe function. Developers should ensure that all user-supplied paths are normalized using standard library functions such as os.path.realpath in Python before any file system operations are performed. This normalization resolves symbolic links and relative path segments to their absolute equivalents, allowing for a robust comparison against an allowed base directory whitelist. Additionally, implementing strict allow-listing of valid recipe identifiers rather than relying on dynamic filename construction can further reduce the risk of such traversal attacks. Regular security audits focusing on input validation and file access controls are recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in automation frameworks that handle external configurations or workflow definitions.