CVE-2026-77975 in NE2-D11
Summary
by MITRE • 08/31/2026
The affected Ebyte
product exports administrative credentials and other sensitive configuration information without adequate protection. An unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network who can obtain an exported configuration file could recover valid credentials and use them to access the device or similarly configured systems.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/31/2026
The vulnerability identified in the Ebyte product represents a critical failure in secure credential management, specifically categorized under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, although it manifests through improper export mechanisms rather than static code embedding. This flaw allows administrative credentials and other sensitive configuration data to be exported from the device without adequate protection such as encryption or access controls. The core technical issue lies in the lack of authorization checks during the retrieval process for configuration files that contain plaintext passwords, API keys, or private cryptographic material. By design, these exports should require authentication or at least obfuscation to prevent unauthorized disclosure, but the implementation fails to enforce any security boundaries around this sensitive data export functionality.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to network integrity and device confidentiality. An unauthenticated attacker positioned on the adjacent network segment can exploit this weakness by simply requesting the configuration file from the affected system. Once obtained, the attacker gains immediate access to valid administrative credentials that are not only sufficient for local device control but also potentially usable against other systems configured with identical or similar settings due to common practices of credential reuse in IoT deployments. This effectively bypasses all intended authentication mechanisms, granting the adversary full privileged access without needing to perform complex exploitation techniques such as buffer overflows or logic flaws.
The impact extends beyond simple unauthorized access. With administrative credentials recovered from the exported configuration file, an attacker can modify device settings, disable security logging, install malicious firmware updates, or use the compromised device as a pivot point for further lateral movement within the network. This aligns with several tactics in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly T1078: Valid Accounts and T1552: Unsecured Credentials. The ability to harvest these credentials facilitates persistent access and undermines the principle of least privilege, which is fundamental to secure system architecture. Furthermore, if the configuration includes network parameters or integration keys for cloud services, the scope of compromise expands significantly, potentially exposing broader organizational infrastructure to remote control and data exfiltration.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Immediately, administrators should rotate all credentials associated with the affected Ebyte devices, assuming that any exported configuration files may have been intercepted by malicious actors during their tenure in production environments. It is also critical to review network segmentation policies to ensure that management interfaces are not accessible from untrusted or adjacent networks without strict firewall rules and mutual TLS authentication. In terms of software updates, vendors should be contacted urgently for patches that enforce access control on configuration export endpoints and implement encryption standards such as AES-256 for sensitive data fields within exported files. Long-term solutions involve adopting secure development lifecycle practices where credential storage follows industry best practices like using hardware security modules or encrypted key stores rather than plaintext configurations, ensuring that even if a file is exfiltrated, the contained secrets remain unusable without additional decryption keys protected by separate mechanisms.