CVE-2026-78574 in Hyperdrive Integration Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 09/08/2026
The Okta Hyperdrive Integration plugin resolves a required assembly using a registry path within the current user's hive without integrity verification. The referenced path is loaded via Assembly.LoadFrom without signature validation, resulting in an unverified assembly executing within the context of the host process or elevated installer.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/08/2026
The vulnerability identified in the Okta Hyperdrive Integration plugin stems from a critical flaw in how dynamic library dependencies are resolved and executed during runtime initialization. Specifically, the application retrieves the path to a required assembly by querying the Windows Registry within the current user's hive rather than relying on secure, versioned deployment mechanisms or trusted locations such as the Global Assembly Cache or signed installation directories. This approach introduces significant risk because registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER are writable by any process running with that user's privileges, allowing an attacker to manipulate the path value without requiring elevated system permissions.
The core technical flaw lies in the subsequent loading of this assembly using the System.Reflection.Assembly.LoadFrom method without implementing signature validation or integrity checks. When .NET applications load assemblies via LoadFrom from arbitrary paths, they bypass many of the security boundaries that protect against tampering unless explicit verification is performed. In this scenario, because no cryptographic signature verification occurs before execution, any malicious code placed in a file at the registry-specified path will be loaded and executed within the context of the host process. This effectively allows for arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running the application or the elevated installer if triggered during installation.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability enables local privilege escalation and potential remote compromise depending on how the plugin is deployed. If a standard user can modify their registry hive to point to a malicious DLL, they can achieve code execution within the context of the Okta Hyperdrive process. This could lead to credential theft, persistence mechanisms being established via legitimate system processes, or lateral movement if the host process has access to sensitive network resources. The lack of integrity verification means that even minor modifications to trusted libraries by malware or insider threats go undetected and unblocked.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-829, which describes Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, as well as CWE-15, External Control of Critical State Variable, due to the reliance on mutable registry data for security-critical operations. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter through dynamic assembly loading, specifically leveraging legitimate system utilities like .NET frameworks to execute malicious payloads without triggering traditional antivirus signatures that look for known malware binaries.
To mitigate this risk, developers should eliminate the use of registry paths for locating critical assemblies entirely. Instead, applications must rely on strong naming and digital signature verification when loading external dependencies. Implementing code access security policies or using modern .NET Core/5+ features like AssemblyLoadContext with strict validation rules can prevent unauthorized assembly loads. Additionally, enforcing application integrity through Windows Event Log monitoring for suspicious registry modifications in the HKCU hive related to Okta components provides an additional layer of defense-in-depth against exploitation attempts.