CVE-2026-81031 in ERP CRM
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
IDURAR ERP CRM changes the password of whichever account a request names rather than the account making the request. The update handler in backend/src/controllers/middlewaresControllers/createUserController/updatePassword.js resolves the authenticated user from the request that the token middleware populated, then issues its update against a filter built from the identifier in the URL path, and never compares the two. The route is mounted behind the administrator token check only, so any valid administrator session is sufficient, and the sole ownership-like guard in the handler rejects a single hardcoded demo address. A caller can therefore set an arbitrary password on any other administrator account and sign in as it. The read handler in the same controller directory accepts an identifier the same way, which supplies the identifiers needed to pick a target.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The vulnerability identified within IDURAR ERP CRM represents a critical Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) flaw located specifically within the password update functionality of the backend application. This security defect arises from a fundamental failure in server-side access control logic, where the system fails to verify that the authenticated user initiating the request is the same entity whose credentials are being modified. The technical root cause lies in the implementation of the update handler found at backend/src/controllers/middlewaresControllers/createUserController/updatePassword.js. During execution, this module correctly resolves the identity of the currently authenticated session by parsing information populated by a preceding token middleware layer. However, when constructing the database query to perform the password change, the application relies exclusively on an identifier extracted directly from the URL path provided in the HTTP request parameters. Crucially, there is no validation step that compares this target identifier against the identity of the authenticated user associated with the session token. This architectural oversight allows any valid administrator-level session to arbitrarily select and modify the credentials of another administrative account simply by altering the identifier present in the request URI.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the privilege level required for exploitation. The vulnerable route is protected only by an administrator token check, meaning that possession of a legitimate admin session is sufficient to trigger the flaw. While there exists a single hardcoded guard intended to prevent modification of a specific demo account address, this protection is easily bypassed as it does not extend to other administrative accounts within the system. Consequently, an attacker with access to any valid administrator token can execute a password reset for any other administrator account on the platform. By setting an arbitrary password, the attacker gains full unauthorized control over that target account, effectively achieving privilege escalation and complete compromise of the affected user's session. This capability undermines the integrity of the entire administrative layer, as it allows one compromised or malicious admin to take over another, potentially leading to broader system compromise depending on the privileges held by the targeted administrator.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, specifically highlighting the failure to enforce proper ownership checks when performing state-changing operations. It also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it involves the misuse of legitimate credentials to gain unauthorized access to specific accounts within a system environment. The read handler located in the same controller directory exhibits similar characteristics by accepting an identifier that allows for the selection of arbitrary targets, suggesting a systemic pattern of insufficient object reference validation across multiple endpoints rather than an isolated incident. This consistency indicates that the application framework lacks robust middleware or design patterns to enforce ownership constraints automatically during data manipulation operations.
To mitigate this vulnerability and prevent future occurrences of similar flaws, immediate remediation is required at both the code level and architectural design stages. The primary fix involves modifying the updatePassword.js handler to strictly validate that the identifier extracted from the URL path matches the user ID associated with the authenticated session token before proceeding with any database updates. This check must be implemented as a mandatory gatekeeping step prior to executing the password change logic. Furthermore, developers should adopt a principle of least privilege and implement server-side ownership verification for all resource modification endpoints. It is also recommended to utilize opaque identifiers or indirect references rather than exposing sequential or predictable user IDs in URLs where possible, although this alone does not replace explicit access control checks. Comprehensive security testing, including automated static analysis tools configured to detect IDOR patterns and manual penetration testing focused on horizontal privilege escalation vectors, should be integrated into the development lifecycle to ensure that such logic errors are identified and resolved before deployment.